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3 Shifting Shapes: how can local care markets support personalised outcomes?
One-page summary 
Local authorities have a duty under the Care 
Act 2014 to shape social care markets and  
a requirement to support ‘personalisation’. 
Through a realist literature review, secondary 
data analysis, a local authority survey, national 
stakeholder interviews, an economic evaluation 
and case study feldwork in eight local 
authorities the research found: 
n    Effective market shaping by local 
authorities is seen by national and local 
stakeholders as a prerequisite for 
achieving personalisation. Working well 
with providers and communities can be a 
way for local authorities to develop stable 
markets and is also essential for stimulating 
the innovation and diversity that underpin 
personalised outcomes. 
n    The terms ‘market shaping’ and 
‘personalisation’ lack a fxed meaning. 
Respondents talked about the interaction of 
two variables: rules (eg, tenders, contracts, 
monitoring) and relationships (between 
local authorities, providers and other local 
stakeholders). 
n    From the national interviews, four types  
of local authority market shaping were 
identifed depending on the extent of local 
authority control (rules) and the nature of 
relationships with local stakeholders: 
1.  open market (low control,  
distant relationships) 
2. partnership (low control,  
close relationships) 
3. procurement (high control,  
distant relationships) 
4. managed market (high control,  
close relationships) 
n  In the open market model, local authorities 
encourage maximum diversity of providers, 
and support individuals and families to fnd 
the best ft for care and support. In the 
partnership model, local authorities work 
closely with a smaller number of providers 
to co-design support that is innovative  
and supports personalised outcomes. 
Respondents associated these two types  
of rule/relationship confgurations with the 
aims of the Care Act. The procurement 
and managed market models, in contrast, 
are more rule-driven and likely to limit scope 
for diversity and innovation. They were seen 
by respondents as attempts by local 
authorities to minimise risk and stabilise the 
system, in response to rising demand and 
fscal pressures rather than a response to 
the Care Act. 
n  The eight local case sites were using  
a combination of the four models in 
different sub-markets. Older people’s 
services were most likely to be ‘high control’ 
(ie, procurement or managed markets), 
whereas support for working age adults was 
most likely to be ‘low control’ (open market 
or partnership). 
n   Sites were drifting between the four 
models over time, often without 
purposively choosing one over another or 
recognising their interdependence. High 
turnover of local authority staff, 
workforce shortages within providers 
and long-term funding uncertainty 
militated against a coherent approach. 
n  The local site research enabled us to 
identify the conditions in which open 
market and partnership approaches are 
likely to fourish. Effective combination  
of the open market and partnership 
approaches require different offers to 
different parts of the market, to give 
providers incentives to innovate either to:  
(a) meet the needs of individual service 
users (including self-funders) in the open 
market; or (b) to develop partnerships for 
the long-term in ways that share risk and 
enable co-design with providers and 
communities. Both are needed in local 
care markets. 
n   Partnership models are best pursued  
in an iterative way to build trust, enable 
providers, service users, families and 
communities to adapt, and to facilitate joint 
working with health and housing. Open 
markets already exist in many areas but  
are fragile and need active local authority 
facilitation to work effectively. 
Recommendations 
Local authority commissioners need 
nationally funded support to build technical  
and relational capabilities, in order to: 
n    Stimulate open market and partnership 
approaches, with different offers to 
different parts of the market. 
n    Develop partnership models through 
forms of commissioning that foster trust, 
learning and long-term investment, and 
allow providers and communities to be  
part of a co-design process. 
n    Facilitate open market approaches 
through stimulating diverse providers and 
personal assistants, and helping to work 
with people using services (including 
self-funders), maximising fexibility and 
innovation and ensuring local quality 
assurance processes are proportionate  
to the level of risk involved. 
National government needs to: 
n    Develop a sustainable funding settlement 
for social care, moving beyond short-term 
allocations that inhibit effective planning 
and partnerships. 
n    Address shortages in the care 
workforce, which local authorities and 
providers cannot resolve locally. 
n    Ensure the regulatory system is 
proportionate and responsive to both  
open market and partnership approaches, 
balancing risk with the fexibility necessary 


























The Care Act 2014 assigned local authorities 
in England the responsibility to ensure that 
there is a wide variety of good quality care 
services available for people who need them. 
This National Institute for Health Research 
Policy Research Programme project initially 
sought to understand how local authorities 
have responded to duties placed on them 
to shape social care markets. We were also 
asked to look at how local authorities were 
responding to the Care Act’s requirement that 
local authorities support individual choice and 
control through ‘personalisation’. This fnal 
report brings together the fndings from both 
strands of the research. Earlier reports from 
the project focused on fndings from a realist 
review of the literature, and from 28 national 
stakeholder interviews and a survey of local 
authorities. We also published two stand-
alone reports on sub-markets within the care 
system: one on people who pay for their 
own care (self-funders) and one on people 
using mental health services. Here we 
combine key insights from all of those earlier 
phases of the work with fndings from feldwork 
in eight local authority case sites, sampled to 
provide maximum diversity. In these sites, the 
research team interviewed local authority staff 
and stakeholders, providers and personal 
assistants, people accessing services (both 
publicly and privately funded) and family carers 
(410 people in total), and collected resource 
use and outcomes data. 
The aspirations of the Care Act to 
improve market shaping and support 
personalised outcomes were endorsed by 
interviewees. However, many participants 
noted a disjuncture between the aspirations 
of the Act and the practices in localities. The 
multiplicity of local care markets makes market 
shaping a complex and fractured activity. There 
are multiple sub-markets in operation within 
a local authority. Market shaping in each is 
dependent on the actions of local authorities 
but also the interactions of providers and the 
people accessing services and carers, other 
commissioners and neighbouring authorities. 
From analysis of the fndings of the national 
interview data, we developed a market 
shaping typology – shown below – framing 
it as the interplay of two key variables: frst, the 
setting of rules, encompassing the extent to 
which the local authority seeks to control the 
social care market; second, the development of
relationships which refects the closeness of 
associations between the local authority and 
the market. 
Stakeholder interviewees favoured approaches 
in which local authorities, providers and people 
using services worked together to shape 
services (which we have called the open 
market and partnership models). They saw
these as the most likely to achieve the aims
of the Care Act, creating effective care markets
that stimulate provider innovation and diversity
in order to offer choice and control to people
using services:
In the open market model, local authorities 
encourage maximum diversity of providers and 
support individuals and families to fnd the best 
ft for their care and support. 
In the partnership model, local authorities 
work closely with a smaller number of 
providers, drawing on data and community 
input to co-design support that is innovative 
and supports personalised outcomes. 
The procurement and managed market 
models, in contrast, are more tightly controlled 
by the local authority and (although they may 
be appropriate in some settings) are likely 
to limit scope for diversity and innovation, 
inhibiting personalisation. 
Assigning market shaping
practices to the typology
Research in the eight case study sites 
enabled us to test the validity of the market 
shaping typology, to develop in more detail the 
practices that were associated with each of 
the four models and to identify any unintended 
consequences. 
We found examples of all four types of 
market shaping. Some sites were using all four 
approaches, with different ones for different 
Figure 1: Market shaping typology 
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Care providers are multiple and
dispersed with provision shaped by
service users as much as by local
authorities. This can be described
as an OPEN MARKET approach. 
LOW 
DISTANT 
Local authority sets service 
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of providers. This can be 
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MARKET approach. 
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sub-markets; others were using two or three 
approaches. The procurement approach
was found in fve sites and was most prevalent 
within older people’s services. In these cases 
(covering residential and home care), a 
dispersed market of providers was operating, 
with the local authority setting rigid contract 
specifcations, such as the so-called ‘time and 
task’ approach to home care. Providers were 
not always ‘price-takers’ in this scenario – 
where there was a shortage of providers 
(for example, in learning disability services for 
people with complex needs), local authorities 
had to give out packages at the provider’s rate. 
The key feature of this model is that there is 
limited collaboration between commissioners 
and providers and minimal choice for the 
people using services. 
The managed market approach was found in 
fve sites. Here, local authorities maintain a high 
level of control over the social care market and 
develop close relationships with a small number 
of providers (eg, through a block or framework 
contract). We found this approach in older 
people’s residential and home care services. 
It may be data-driven, based on mapping of 
need in the local area. It is a top-down 
approach, in that the local authority specifes 
the service required. As the local authority is 
working with a smaller number of providers, 
service-users’ choice of provider is limited. 
Several areas were using this in an attempt to 
secure supply, often on a neighbourhood basis, 
but found that it had not stabilised the market 
as intended. 
In all of our sites, we found some evidence of 
the open market approach being used. In the 
open market approach, the role of the local 
authority is to facilitate the interaction between 
providers and service-users, but not to set 
strong limits on market entry or user choice. All 
sites offered some type of open market access 
through direct payments, particularly oriented 
towards working age people with disabilities. 
We found some examples of older self-funders 
employing micro-enterprises to provide their 
care. Direct payments take-up varied from 
ten to 40% in our sites. Even in the sites 
with higher rates of direct payment, we found 
limited support given to individuals or providers 
to stimulate supply or match it with demand, 
without which many people struggled to 
fnd and sustain care arrangements in the 
open market. 
Four sites were using the partnership 
approach in parts of their market. This 
entails a close relationship between local 
authorities and providers to co-design and 
develop service provision, with input from other 
stakeholders, including communities. This 
model was found in sites that were taking 
a strategic and more outcomes-oriented 
approach to commissioning, particularly for 
working-age adults. This approach requires 
high trust relationships over the long-term, and 
the ability to support people holistically through 
engaging with partners such as health and 
housing, and wider community assets. It 
requires awareness of the limits of outcome 
measurement and attribution in a complex 
system, such that risk is shared and there is 
scope for experimentation and learning. There 
was widespread support for this model, even in 
sites that weren’t yet using it. However, across 
all the sites, we found low levels of trust 
between commissioners and providers, and 
indeed amongst providers, which inhibited the 
scope for this level of partnership working. 
All of the sites in our study were in transition, 
combining and travelling between the four 
models as they sought to discharge their 
market shaping duties more effectively. The 
dynamic nature of market shaping, moving 
between models and combining different 
models for different sub-markets, hampered 
efforts to identify the costs of market shaping
and to link it to outcomes. We weren’t able to 
draw conclusions about cost-effectiveness 
(discussed in Part 5). 
Some sites had taken a path from procurement 
to managed market, then open market and now 
partnership, which roughly tracks the timeline 
of national policy priorities through 
care management (procurement), then 
commissioning (managed market), then 
personalisation (open market) and now 
prevention/integration (partnership). This 
trajectory has been encouraged by a range 
of sector bodies (eg, the Social Care Institute 
for Excellence and Think Local, Act Personal). 
However, the open market and partnership 
approaches require local authorities to cede 
considerable amounts of control to providers 
and to people using services. We found the 
perceived risks of this generated countervailing 
forces pulling commissioners towards the ‘high 
control’ half of the typology. Rising demand, 
constraints on public spending, insuffcient 
staffng, weak consumer power and poor fows 
of information had the cumulative effect of 
steering some local authorities towards forms 
of market shaping which they felt would 
stabilise care markets. There can be a 
perceived trade-off between individual choice 
and market stability, and local authority 
commissioners don’t necessarily have the skills 
and broader organisational support needed for 
the ‘low control’ approaches to market shaping. 
To fulfl the aspirations of the Care Act, the 
open market and partnership approaches 
need to be used in combination. This 
requires different offers to different parts of the 
market, to give providers incentives to innovate 
either to: (a) meet the needs of people using 
services in an open market; or (b) develop 
partnerships for the long-term in ways that 
share risk and enable co-design with 
communities. Partnership models are best 
pursued in an iterative way to build trust, 
enable providers, service-users, families and 
communities to adapt, and to facilitate joint 
working with other services such as health and 
housing. Open markets already exist in many 
areas but are fragile and need active local 
authority facilitation to work effectively. There 
are tensions to address when combining the 
two models, as discussed in Part 6: Getting 







































Local authority commissioners need to: 
1. Make purposive and strategic decisions 
in their approach to market shaping. 
The typology developed by this project 
can be used to recognise the nuance 
and interconnectedness of social care 
sub-markets. Whilst local authorities 
may be using all four approaches in 
the short-term to ensure continuity of 
supply, commissioners should be looking 
to stimulate the open market and 
partnership approaches. 
2. Develop partnership models. Local 
authorities need to use forms of 
commissioning that foster trust, 
transparency and long-term investment and 
allow communities to be part of a co-design 
process. This is likely to require more 
open-book accounting, pooling of data and 
a willingness to share the risks of innovation. 
Achieving personalised outcomes requires 
sensitivity to the wide range of outcomes 
that people want from care and support 
and will require considerable fexibility and 
scope for variation in the support provided, 
as well as sensitivity to the diffculties of 
measuring and attributing outcomes in 
complex systems. 
3. Facilitate the open market model. Local 
authorities also need to stimulate the 
emergence of a diverse range of providers 
and personal assistants, and help to match 
them with people who want to access 
support in this way (including self-funders), 
ensuring quality assurance processes are 
proportionate to the level of risk involved. 
Smaller providers and personal assistants 
may require help with business support 
and relevant care regulations. 
4. Be explicit about making different offers 
to different parts of the market. Existing 
providers may be hostile to the stimulation 
of an open market of PAs and unregulated 
micro-providers if this feels like a lack of 
a ‘level playing feld’. The partnership 
approach offers long-term investment 
on a co-design and learning basis, which 
is likely to be of interest to established 
providers – and can be combined with 
the open market, so long as the tensions 
between the two approaches are 
discussed and managed. 
5. Recognise self-funders and direct 
payment holders as co-commissioners 
of care: changes to the size and shape of 
care markets will have signifcant 
implications for people who commission 
their own care. Local authorities need to 
anticipate and understand these impacts, 
and work to ensure that individuals and 
families are able to navigate the market. 
At the same time, the actions and choices 
of individuals (especially self-funders) have 
implications for the wider local care market; 
failing to take account of the cumulative 
impact of individualised commissioning will 
constrain local authorities’ understanding 
of their care markets and their ability to 
shape them. 
All of these elements require support and 
training. There are many existing tools available 
to support local authority market shaping – 
for example the Commissioning for Better 
Outcomes framework and Integrated
Commissioning for Better Outcomes
(developed in partnership by the Department 
of Health and Social Care (DHSC), the Local 
Government Association (LGA) and the 
Association of Directors of Adult Social 
Services (ADASS)), and resources from the 
Institute of Public Care. There are also a 
number of improvement initiatives within the 
sector, such as the LGA’s Peer Challenge 
scheme and the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC)’s Local System Reviews. 
However, limited local authority capacity 
and high staff turnover in commissioning has 
made it diffcult to make effective use of these 
resources and has impeded long-term 
relationship building with external stakeholders. 
Commissioning for market shaping requires: 
i. Recruiting for the right values and skills 
within commissioning teams, recognising 
that effective commissioners require a 
combination of technical and relational 
capabilities. 
ii. Training on the relational and 
entrepreneurial aspects of the role as 
well as on the legal and technical aspects. 
Resources such as the 21st Century 
Public Servant framework are available 
which offer this broader focus. 
iii. Creating opportunities to build trust
between local authority staff (encompassing 
procurement/legal teams as well as 
commissioners) and external stakeholders 
to facilitate co-design. 
iv. Supporting staff retention in 
commissioning roles, recognising that trust 
is a long-term asset, and is diffcult to 
sustain with a rapidly changing workforce. 
v. Developing the market shaping capacities 
of elected members. Their broader 
strategic role in local authorities means that 
they must be part of any new approach. 
Some of this support could be located at a 
regional level. Peckham et al’s evaluation 
of the Care Act Implementation Programme 
highlighted how much local authorities valued 
the role of a regional coordinator within that 
programme. Some regions are already offering 
commissioner training, which could be further 
developed. Where the focus is on building 
local relationships (within and beyond the 
local authority) this will need to be done at 
a smaller scale. 
These activities need to be funded 
through dedicated new resources. The 
Commissioning Support Programme for 
Children’s Services could provide a useful 
template for such an approach, as it evaluated 
well and was found to have ‘made a positive 
contribution to developing the skills and 
knowledge of the sector’ (DfE, 2010, p.9). 











Action at the local level has to be 
complemented by national policy change. 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC)
funding for Care Act preparedness and national 
resources/toolkits have been helpful to the 
sector, but the Act cannot be the basis for 
effective market shaping and personalisation 
without action on other aspects of the national 
care system which are not the direct focus of 
this report: 
1. Securing the adequacy of funding in 
the social care system, moving beyond 
short-term allocations that inhibit effective 
planning and partnerships. Market shaping 
requires stability and investment over the 
long-term. 
2. Increasing capacity in the care workforce. 
This is a key concern among local 
authorities and providers, and requires a 
national strategy, alongside local action. 
3. Ensuring the regulatory system is 
proportionate and responsive to both open 
market and partnership approaches, with a 
clear rationale for which parts of the system 
need to be regulated and which do not. 
Overall, this research suggests that there is 
great potential and local appetite to develop 
partnership and open market approaches – 
but that this is very diffcult without secure 
funding and a stable policy settlement. 
Shaping care markets cannot be the job of 
a heroic lone commissioner – it requires a 
sustained commitment by all stakeholders to 
































The Care Act 2014 assigned local 
authorities in England a broad wellbeing duty 
and responsibility to ensure the availability of 
a wide variety of good quality care and support 
services for people who need them. Older 
people, people with disabilities, people using 
mental health services, and people with caring 
responsibilities should all have access to 
information about what support is available 
locally, whether publicly or privately funded. 
That support should be person-centred and 
high quality. 
This document reports on independent 
research by the University of Birmingham 
commissioned and funded by the National 
Institute for Health Research Policy Research 
Programme. It draws on two projects: 
PR-R14-1215- 21004 Shifting-Shapes: how 
can local care markets support quality and 
choice for all? and PR-ST-1116-10001 
Shaping Personalised Outcomes – How is 
the Care Act promoting the personalisation 
of care and support? These projects focus 
on two aspects of the Care Act which underpin 
high-quality support: frst, the duty placed on 
local authorities to shape local care markets; 
second, the requirement to support individual 
choice and control within the broader wellbeing 
duty, which is referred to by the term 
‘personalisation’ in the Care Act statutory 
guidance. Whilst these are two separate 
elements in the Care Act, they are closely 
interrelated, and we were asked to look at 
both of them together. 
This is the fnal project report. Earlier reports 
from the project focused on fndings from a 
realist review of the literature, and from 
national stakeholder interviews and a 
survey of local authorities. We also published 
two stand-alone reports on elements of the 
care system: on people who pay for their 
own care (self-funders) and on people using 
mental health services. Here we combine key 
insights from all of those earlier phases of the 
work with fndings from feldwork in eight local 
authority case sites. 
Statutory guidance on the Care Act (DH, 2017, 
para 4.7) defnes market shaping as follows: 
The core activities of market shaping are 
to engage with stakeholders to develop 
understanding of supply and demand and… 
based on evidence, to signal to the market 
the types of services needed now and in 
the future to meet them, encourage 
innovation, investment and continuous 
improvement. It also includes working to 
ensure that those who purchase their own 
services are empowered to be effective 
consumers, for example, by helping people 
who want to take direct payments make 
informed decisions about employing 
personal assistants. 
This role is discharged by local authorities. 
The Care Act also gave the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) a national role in market 
shaping, monitoring the ‘fnancial health’
of care providers which, ‘because of their 
size, geographic concentration or other 
factors, would be diffcult for one or more 
local authorities to replace, and therefore, where
national oversight is required’ (DH, 2017, para
5.17). Here, we focus on the local authority
element of market shaping rather than on the
CQC role.
Expectations relating to personalisation are also 
set out in statutory guidance that accompanies 
the Act (DH, 2017, para 4.46): 
Local authorities should facilitate the 
personalisation of care and support 
services, encouraging services (including 
small, local, specialised and personal 
assistant services that are highly tailored), 
to enable people to make meaningful 
choices and to take control of their support 
arrangements, regardless of service setting 
or how their personal budget is managed. 
Below, we set out the methods used in 
the research and then examine how local 
authorities are shaping care markets to achieve 
personalised outcomes. Research instruments 
and coding frame are available on request in 
a supplementary fle. 
1.1 Methods
The methods used across the project are 
outlined here. Ethical approval for the project 
was granted by the NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (17/LO/1729). The Association 
of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS) 
also gave approval for the research (RG17-
05). 
Involving people with lived experience:
The research was undertaken alongside 
people with lived experience of using social 
care services. Isabelle Brant, a co-applicant on 
the project, has a diagnosis of autism and has 
experience of accessing statutory services. She 
was involved in the research design, analysis 
and writing, and developed the training for the 
co-researchers. These were 19 people with 
lived experience of care services, located 
across the eight local case sites, who 
co-designed interview questions, interviewed 
participants, and contributed to analyses and 
recommendations. 
First stage: National level: The frst stage of 
the project, undertaken in 2017, considered 
the context of social care market shaping and 
personalisation at a national level (further 
details can be found in Shifting Shapes 
Report of Work Package 1). Twenty-eight 
senior leaders of key national organisations 
and opinion formers in the care sector were 
interviewed. An online questionnaire was sent 
to 152 local authorities in England with primary 
social care responsibilities, with a response 
rate of 18%. This stage also included 
secondary analysis of national datasets on 
care outcomes reported by people using 
state-funded services, which we combined 
with other data (the estimated prevalence of 























self-funding in each local authority site, type 
of council, geographical spread and political 
control) to develop the sample of eight case 
sites used in the second stage. 
Second stage: Local level: Eight local 
authorities agreed to participate in the research 
under the condition of anonymity. These were 
balanced according to the sampling criteria set 
out previously. In total across these case study 
sites, the research team interviewed and ran 
focus groups with 410 people (face-to-face 
or by telephone) during 2018. These 
encompassed local authority commissioners 
and care managers, elected members, other 
local stakeholders (eg, from health or the 
voluntary sector), providers, people using 
services and families, and potential users. 
Participants were recruited through snowball 
sampling, using the local authority to 
recommend providers, and then providers or 
other local stakeholders to recommend users 
and carers. We made use of local third sector 
organisations to identify potential users – 
people who were attending groups such as 
lunch clubs but not yet using statutory care 
services – so that their views could be 
included. Interviews and focus groups were 
transcribed and analysed in QSR-NVivo 11, 
using a two-stage thematic coding process 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). Comparisons were 
made between each team member’s coding 
and discussions took place on interpretations 
of the codes, after which refnements were 
made to the fnal coding frame. In the fnal 
months of the project, local authority 
commissioners from the case sites took part 
in a peer-learning exercise to discuss market 
shaping practices, member-test our fndings 
and to shape emerging recommendations. 
Economic evaluation: The project team also 
conducted an exploratory economic evaluation 
of market shaping. A total of 75 service-users 
were recruited at baseline and 49 service-
users completed follow-up surveys at six
months, giving a response rate of 65%. For 
the main base case analysis we restricted 
the sample to only those respondents who 
had provided both baseline and six-month
follow-up data. This was to isolate the effect of 
market shaping on resource use and quality of 
life over time and avoid making any misleading 
conclusions that could be simply due to losses 
to follow-up. Ninety-two carers were recruited 
at baseline and 54 carers completed follow-up 
questionnaires at six months, giving a response 
rate of 59%. Participants accessing services 
and family carers were asked to complete a 
questionnaire which captured self-reported 
measures of quality of life and resource use 
– combining the Client Service Receipt
Inventory (CSRI), the Adult Social Care
Outcomes Toolkit (ASCOT) and the ICEpop
CAPability measure for Adults (ICECAP). A
follow-up questionnaire was then completed
after six months to gauge whether there had
been any change in participants’ levels of
reported quality of life and resource use.
Limitations: The response rate on the local 
authority survey was disappointingly low. We 
utilised ADASS’s communication channels to 
try to improve the responses, but weren’t able 
to raise it above 18%. We recognise that this 
is a limitation of the survey data as it may be 
those local authorities with the greatest interest 
in (or problems with) market shaping who 
responded. Findings from the survey were used 
to identify general themes which were then 
explored in the local case study feldwork, 
rather than to derive generalisations about the 
sector. Two of our original eight local authority 
case sites dropped out and had to be replaced; 
although we retained the balance of sampling 
characteristics, we recognise that the eight 
participating sites may be atypical in being 
open to research about their market shaping 
activities. Similarly, people who agree to be 
interviewed, take part in focus groups and 
complete the questionnaires may be those 
who are most motivated to talk about their 
experiences, and may not represent the 
broader care population. 
In terms of the overall recruitment in the sites, 
as shown in Table 1 we under-recruited in most
categories, particularly in targeting ‘potential 
users’ who by defnition were not yet using 
services. As Table 2 shows, we did not get a 
representative sample across all types of care 
service users (we over-recruited people with 
learning disabilities and under-recruited people 
with physical disabilities). This was a limit 
of our snowball sampling, where we were 
reliant on contacts given to us by others.
However, we did not have alternative routes 
for accessing people across multiple care 
services, including those such as self-funders 
who are often hidden. 
For the economic analysis, most of the 
carers (95%) and two-thirds (67%) of the 
service-users completed the CRSI, ASCOT 
and ICECAP surveys at the point of interview, 
with assistance from the researcher where 
requested. The return rate was lower than 
hoped during the second wave of data 
collection. This is likely to be due to this being 
a postal survey, whereas the frst wave of 
questionnaires were face-to-face, and also to 
changes in health and other circumstances. To 
maximise the response, we gave a £10 voucher 
to people who posted back the second wave 
surveys. However, we were not able to raise 
the response rate beyond 65% for service-
users and 59% for carers. 
A further limitation of the economic analysis is 
that the study included a wide range of people 
with different types of social care need. This 
meant that the analysis encompasses people 
with a wide variance in terms of their care 
spend, a point that is discussed later in terms 
of implications when reporting average 
weekly spending. 
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Table 1: Summary of target and achieved number of interviews 
Participant type Target Achieved % 
INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS 
National stakeholder interviews 30 28 93% 
Local authority staff member interviews 56 66 118% 
Local stakeholder interviews 24 14 58% 
Managers of care providers/microproviders/personal assistant interviews 72 66 92% 
People accessing care and support services interviews 160 111 69% 
Carer interviews and focus group participants 128 97 76% 
Potential user interviews and focus group participants 128 56 44% 
Total included 598 438 73% 
SURVEYS 
Local authority survey 152 27 18% 
Cost-effective analysis questionnaires people accessing services (Time 1) 160 75 47% 
Cost-effective analysis questionnaires people accessing services (Time 2) 75 49 65% 
Cost-effective analysis questionnaires carers (Time 1) 128 92 72% 
Cost-effective analysis questionnaires carers (Time 2) 92 54 59% 
Table 2: Profle of sample by type of service compared to national profle (NHS Digital, 2018a; 2018b) 
Sample (%) National estimate % 
Learning disability or autism services 15 
Physical disability services 6 10 
Older people services 48 66 
36 
Mental health services 11 7 




























Part 2: The national context
The system-wide contextual factors infuencing 
market shaping and personalisation have been 
well covered in existing literature and discussed 
in detail in earlier project reports (see for 
example, Communities and Local Government 
Select Committee, 2017; Health and Social 
Care and Housing, Communities and Local 
Government Committees, 2018; King’s Fund 
and Nuffeld Trust, 2016; Needham, et al., 
2018a; Needham, et al., 2018b). The 
combination of cuts in local authority funding 
and workforce shortages in the sector has 
created a very diffcult context for Care Act 
implementation. Across all levels of our research
there was support for the principles of the Act,
alongside dismay at a fnancial context which
had hampered its implementation. 
Local authorit[ies are in] an incredibly 
diffcult situation. They’ve had money 
stripped out of them like there’s no 
tomorrow, need is rising and costs are 
rising… [Y]ou’ve got the kind of balance 
between am I paying for today in terms 
of putting together this package for this 
lady who needs to be discharged from 
hospital… or am I paying for ensuring 
that tomorrow is in a better place?
National interview 3 
National interviewees said that at a local level 
the Care Act had had limited impact. Some 
interviewees reported that the legislation had 
helped to raise the profle of market shaping 
and also signalled to local authorities their 
wider responsibilities. Despite this, 
interviewees felt that they had seen little actual 
change since the Act and that the legislation 
was a weak lever for change. There was a 
general consensus that aspects of the care 
market were often beyond the control of local 
authorities. 
Attempts to shape markets could be 
infuenced by external factors, as well as 
cross-departmental relationships within 
local authorities (eg, with procurement 
and legal teams). 
…I think probably if you were good at 
that kind of thing before the Care Act 
you’re probably… still good at that kind 
of thing and if you weren’t, does the 
Act make a difference? Because what 
people understand by shaping the 
market and how much they feel able to 
do so I suppose sort of depends on, 
what the capability and capacity is in 
the local area… National interview 19 
Market position statements were recognised 
by national interviewees as a potential channel 
to communicate the local authority’s vision for 
social care. However, interviewees believed 
that these statements, in their current form, 
did not facilitate this and did not supply the 
data required to support providers’ service 
development. It was noted in particular that 
the data within the statements were often 
focused on demographic projections rather 
than developing a vision as to how a holistic 
care system can respond to possible future 
demands. Some interviewees noted the 
potential role of technology in facilitating 
innovation in social care. While generally 
viewed positively, technology was seen as a 
supplement to caring relationships between 
care staff and people accessing services rather 
than a replacement. There was recognition that 
it required investment, both fnancially and in 
terms of staff training, but there was also 
uncertainty about the best time to invest in 
technology given the pace of change. 
National interviewees and local authority survey 
respondents reported a great deal of concern 
around the adequacy of social care funding
both now and in the future, with almost all 
(96%) survey respondents reporting they were 
concerned about the sustainability of care 
providers in their locality in the current fnancial 
climate. Whilst there have been some 
additional resources allocated to social care 
nationally in recent years (NHS Digital, 2018a), 
austerity was a dominant theme in all phases of 
the feldwork, and it is diffcult to overstate the 
extent of anxiety about suffciency of resource 
and capacity. The perception of funding 
scarcity was the lens through which all of our 
local authority respondents framed their 
understanding of market shaping: 
…we’re desperate to support the 
market, but actually we haven’t got 
suffcient funds available to be able to 
do that in the way we would want. Site 
8, local authority interviewee 2 
The Care Act was great on paper. I 
don’t think it’s had much infuence at 
the bottom end… If you haven’t got the 
mechanisms and means to support it to 
make it work, then it becomes a good 
coffee table support. Site 1, provider 7 
Conditions of scarcity were evident in relation
to overall local authority care budgets and the
need to ration care more tightly. They also
related to workforce shortages, including the
uncertainty over national immigration rules. Lack
of capacity was particularly evident in relation to
nursing care, where two of the sites indicated
that they were considering entering the market
in partnership with health commissioners in















































[We are] competing with retail and 
tourism, so even where providers are 
paying more the National Living Wage, 
recruitment and retention is a major 
issue. Local authority survey 
respondent 14 
Cuts to local authority budgets had had an
impact on social care teams in local authorities,
with job cuts reported in all of our sites. 
Workloads had increased and this had led to
delays in assessment and review processes.
The accompanying churn in commissioning
staff was seen as resulting in a loss of
organisational memory, which fractured
relationships with stakeholders and risked
repeating previous errors. Local stakeholders
from outside the local authority reported that
high staff turnover in the local authority made
it diffcult to maintain working relationships.
This voluntary sector leader pointed out:
Change of personnel… it’s chronic 
within the local authority, absolutely 
chronic, they just keep changing jobs. 
So, they have no history. So, literally, 
people on the outside, the providers are 
saying to them, ‘Do you not know you 
did this fve years ago?’ And they’re 
saying, ‘No, no, we have nobody here 
who actually remembers that.’ 
Site 2, local stakeholder 1 
Many interviewees reported that the need to
make short-term savings was prioritised over
innovation; providers frequently said that their
conversations with local authority commissioners
were focused on fee levels rather than wider
service provision. Some providers reported
that cuts to their fees meant that they had to
concentrate on their business surviving rather
than investing in service development. 
I think innovation and social care is 
really hampered by lack of strategic, 
long-term planning with commissioners, 
and providers, and families, and 
individuals, because people are just so 
desperate with their in-house yearly 
pressures. There’s no joined-up thinking 
or big plan. Site 4, provider 1 
In contrast, there was optimism from some
national interviewees that the need to make
effciencies had prompted local authorities and
providers to develop more creative ways to
deliver care by forcing them to work differently
with providers. 
All the cuts that have happened to 
local authority funding you know have 
a signifcant impact… Necessity is the 
mother of invention and it’s forced 
people to think differently… 
National interview 16 
Whether conditions of scarcity and uncertainty
stimulate innovation or risk-aversion may in part
be dispositional – a feature of the attitudes of
the people we interviewed or the broader
cultures of their organisations. However, by
exploring in more detail the local authority market
shaping approaches in the case sites we were
able to better understand how different types of
market shaping fostered or stifed innovation. 
Cuts to local
authority budgets
had had an impact on
social care teams in
local authorities, with
job cuts reported in
all of our sites.











Part 3: How are local authorities
shaping their markets to ensure
personalised outcomes?
We have structured our fndings around 
how four types of market shaping link to 
personalised outcomes. The four models 
are derived from analysis of the national 
stakeholder interviews in the frst phase of our 
data collection, which we then tested in the 
eight case local authorities. The market shaping 
typology positions effective market shaping and 
personalisation as a feature of the patterned 
interaction between local authorities and 
providers, and in particular the setting of rules
and the development of relationships. Having 
found these two themes in our stage one data, 
we developed them using the grid/group theory 
of anthropologist Mary Douglas (eg, Douglas, 
1970/2004; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; 
Entwistle et al., 2016; Simmons, 2016; 
Wildavsky, 1987). Grid/group theory has been 
used extensively in institutional analysis and 
public management to consider how far 
people’s lives are governed by external rules 
(the grid dimension) and how far people feel 
part of a loose or tightly bounded social group 
(the group dimension). 
In relation to market shaping and 
personalisation, the rule dimension positions 
local authorities on a spectrum between taking 
a rule-based approach or a more open and 
emergent approach: for example, they can 
create highly specifed contracts for providers 
and impose tight limits on how people spend 
their personal budgets; or they can be more 
fexible on these aspects to maximise diversity 
and choice. On the relationship dimension, 
the spectrum of local authority behaviours can 
span from creating close relationships with 
providers (for example, active provider forums 
and collaborative forms of commissioning) to 
taking a less interventionist approach in which 
it is left to providers and service-users to 
develop bilateral relationships. These four 
models allow the development of a typology 
of market shaping practices. 
Stakeholder interviewees favoured approaches 
in which local authorities, providers and people 
using services worked together to shape 
services (which we have called the open 
market and partnership models). They 
saw these as the most likely to achieve the 
aims of the Care Act, creating effective care 
markets that stimulate provider innovation and 
diversity in order to offer choice and control to 
people using services: 
In the open market model, local authorities 
encourage maximum diversity of providers and 
support individuals and families to fnd the best 
ft for their care and support. 
In the partnership model, local authorities 
work closely with a smaller number of 
providers, drawing on data and community 
input to co-design support that is innovative 
and supports personalised outcomes. 
The procurement and managed market 
models, in contrast, are more rule-driven and 
prescriptive. They may be appropriate for 
aspects of care markets (eg, the provision of 
aids and appliances, including technological 
supports, or ensuring rapid discharge from 
hospital), but are less likely to advance 
personalised outcomes and, hence, we 
consider these approaches to be less 
compatible with the Care Act. 
Open market and partnership approaches 
differ in the extent to which they encourage 
close or distant relationships between local 
authorities and providers. Both approaches 
have the potential to deliver on aspects of the 
Care Act and could be used in combination
for different parts of the market. However, local 
authorities need to understand and mitigate 
tensions between them, as discussed later in 
this report. 
Figure 2: Market shaping typology 
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Research in the eight case study sites 
enabled us to test the validity of the market 
shaping typology, to develop in more detail the 
practices that were associated with each of 
the four models, and to identify any unintended 
consequences. 
We found examples of all four types of 
market shaping. However, rather than each 
site deploying one of the four approaches, we 
found that they were pursuing several types of 
market shaping simultaneously. This refected 
how they interacted with the sub-markets in 
their locality, and their tendency to move 
between different types. Most of our local 
authority respondents talked about having 
different sub-markets according to the type
of service, although some did recognise the 
artifcial nature of these categories: 
We have artifcial fnancial constructs
which are called home care, residential
care, nursing care, extra care, temporary...
You know, those are constructed by
fnancial funding streams. Site 2, local
stakeholder 2
Due to separating out these different sub-
markets, local authority commissioners found 
it diffcult to talk about the market as a whole. 
It’s very diffcult to think across the whole
picture, isn’t it? We’ll end up with: market
shaping for home care looks like this and
your assets-based community shaping
looks like that, but it’s so diffcult to bring
it all together. Site 4, local authority
interviewee 1 
[In residential care] we’re talking about
companies based in the Cayman
Islands… it’s a very different animal to
say looking at befriending services which
would be much more community/ 
voluntary sector response. Site 6, local
authority interviewee 1
Commissioners also refected on the 
diffculties of putting boundaries around 
‘their market’, due to the infuence of 
neighbouring authorities and other 
commissioners, including the NHS and 
self-funders. This might affect parts of a 
borough more than others and may infuence 
provider capacity and workforce availability, 
if other commissioners pay higher wages.
It may also distort the provision offered, 
detracting from the priorities and preferred 
market shaping strategy of that local authority. 
These four models 
allow the development 
of a typology of market 
shaping practices. 
[O]ur ability to market shape is very
different in different areas… It’s impacted
a great deal by whether we are the main
and/or sole commissioner or whether
there are commissioners in health, in
other authorities and self-funded. Site 3,
local authority interviewee 1
Some of our sites were deliberately 
distinguishing their market shaping 
approaches in different sub-markets, for 
example, developing a partnership-oriented 
approach to mental health services or 
developing the open market within learning 
disability support, and planning to address 
other parts of the market at a later date (‘Older 
people’s care home market… we haven’t got 
any bespoke plans around how we deal with 
that market’ – Site 1, local authority interviewee 
1). Others were taking a less purposeful or 
explicit approach, and simply had in place 
a number of different and sometimes 
contradictory approaches to market shaping. 








Figure 3: Market shaping typology and assigned practices
Procurement approach 
High control, distant relationships 
Often used in residential and home care markets. 
Likely to be limited choice for individuals. May be tight controls in 
place for direct payment (DP) holders (eg, pre-payment cards). 
Self-funders are invisible but subsidise the LA market. 
Example: spot purchasing 
Managed market approach 
High control, close relationships 
Often used in home care markets. Likely to be limited 
choice for individuals. DP holders may be steered towards 
framework providers. Self-funders may fnd choice limited 
as local authorities deliberately shrink the market. 
Example: framework contract 
Open market approach 
Low control, distant relationships 
Characterised by high uptake of DPs and provider variety 
(including personal assistants). Likely to be used most for working 
age people with disabilities. Self-funders can beneft from the 
market diversity and from any market facilitation undertaken by 
the local authority. 
Example: support for provider diversity, 
eg, PAs, micro-enterprises 
Partnership approach 
Low control, close relationships 
Some examples of this; most sites aimed to move 
in this direction. Providers co-design and work with local 
authorities over the long-term, with community input. This 
approach may limit provider choice for DP holders and 
self-funders. 
Example: outcomes-based commissioning 
Despite the intentions of the Care Act we 
found that self-funders continued to be treated 
largely as bystanders by local authority market 
shaping strategies (discussed in further detail 
in our earlier report on self-funders, Henwood 
et al., 2018). Figure 3 shows the types of 
sub-market that we identifed, displaying the 
characteristics of the four quadrants. 
Figure 4 shows the allocation of sub-markets
within our eight local authorities – using the 
service labels that were used by local authority 
interviewees (whilst acknowledging that these 
labels are artifcial and can be misleading 
(SCIE, 2004)). It shows those sub-markets 
where we had suffcient data to make an 
allocation. Self-funders are shown as 
free-foating – in the middle of the diagram 
– infuenced by but also impacting on the 
dominant approach in their locality and 
sub-market. 
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Part 4: Features and
effectiveness of the four models
Through the feldwork, we were able to identify 
the features and effectiveness of each of 
the four approaches to market shaping, to 
identify why they are expected to work, what 
are the contingent factors that affect how the 
approaches operate, and the implications for 
aspects such as integration with health and 
the self-funder experience. We also consider 
whether each model is likely to promote 
personalised outcomes as envisaged by 
the Care Act. 
4.1 Procurement – high control,
distant relationships
The procurement approach shapes the market 
through a combination of high local authority 
control and a dispersed market of providers 
who bid for contracts. 
Shaping the market through procurement
In fve of our eight sites, we found examples of 
the procurement approach, in which the local 
authority focused on developing service
specifcations without involvement of
providers. The use of spot contracts and 
dynamic purchasing systems were examples 
of this approach, with an emphasis on what is 
sometimes called ‘time and task’ contracting. 
We found it to be particularly prevalent in older 
people’s residential care, and it was also used 
in older people’s home care and learning 
disability support in some sites. 
The rationale for using a procurement approach 
was mixed. In some local authorities, it was 
seen as the best way to get competitively
priced care in a just-in-time way – adhering 
to minimum care standards and stringent 
budget constraints whilst also satisfying 
the requirements of procurement law. 
Market shaping, in this model, is mainly 
about cost-effectiveness. 
My understanding of market shaping is
that it’s almost encouraging providers to
be more competitive in terms of could
they provide more value for money in
care? And can [they] then provide higher
standards of care? So if that provider
didn’t meet the standards we required,
we could… potentially put it out to tender
and ask another provider to take their
place, so we can shape the market in
terms of we can get better value for
money and we can get competitive




















































In other sites, it marked an earlier era of 
commissioning activity, which had been 
abandoned in some parts of the market but 
persisted in others. Some interviewees blamed 
their own procurement departments for 
refusing to move away from this approach: 
[C]ommissioning is one side of a coin,
procurement is another side of a coin… 
[W]e’ve had a lot of our historical
contracts end up the way they are
because the procurement department
said you can only procure in this way.
Site 5, local authority interviewee 4 
In the procurement approach, the emphasis 
is on matching supply and demand, rather than 
proactively shaping the market. Providers may 
be subject to local authority quality schemes 
to assure minimum standards, but local 
authorities maintain control rather than 
engaging in co-design. Information, advice 
and advocacy is a low priority, since primacy 
is given to placing people quickly and 
cost-effectively, rather than in facilitating 
individual choice. 
Integration with other services, such as 
health, is hard to achieve in this model, due 
to the lack of external dialogue with other 
stakeholders and the just-in-time approach 
to commissioning. Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCG) (who are also commissioning 
care services) may themselves also be taking a 
procurement approach. For example, this care 
provider highlighted the problems of working 
with their local CCG: 
I’m the only [provider] who’s got any kind
of communication with the CCG… [The
CCG] had no idea what they had
[commissioned], they didn’t know what
they bought, they didn’t know how much
they’d paid for it, they didn’t know where
it was. So they couldn’t give an uplift,
because they hadn’t got a clue what
they’d got. Site 2, provider 1 
The procurement approach was highly 
unpopular with provider interviewees, and 
seen as unlikely to stimulate a vibrant and 
sustainable care market. Providers saw it as 
coming from a local authority attitude of ‘we 
know best’: ‘They make all the decisions before 
they enter into any kind of consultation with 
providers’ (Site 2, provider 1). It was seen as 
antithetical to the principles of the Care Act 
(‘We can’t deliver personalisation properly if 
you’re watching the clock’ – Site 2, provider 
1), with no incentive to innovate. Providers saw 
it as being driven by short-termism within local 
authorities, which inhibited effective relationships
and proper planning: 
[W]e get phone calls every single week
from the same commissioners, going,
‘Can you do this for six people, and can
you do it by, like, yesterday?’ We’re like,
‘No, we can’t, but we’d love to sit down
with you and plan what you need for 12
months’ time, and we can get that to
happen.’ ‘Well, we need something for
now’… Site 4, provider 1 
Nonetheless, providers were not always 
‘price-takers’ in this scenario – where there 
was a shortage of providers (for example, in 
learning disability services for people with 
complex needs), local authorities had to give 
out packages at the provider’s rate. However, 
there remained limited collaboration between 
commissioners and providers, and minimal 
choice for the people using services. 
Personalisation in the procurement approach 
Under the Care Act, local authorities are 
expected to facilitate personalisation through 
encouraging market diversity and enabling 
people to make choices and take control of 
their support arrangements. In the procurement 
model, using time and task contracts for home 
care or spot purchasing of residential care 
placements, choice and control for people 
using services is limited. Quality concerns 
were also raised by interviewees. In all of our 
sites, we found variants of the following home 
care experience, here reported by someone 
caring for her mother who has a diagnosis 
of dementia: 
They’re supposed to come in at 7.00 in
the morning to see to her, but sometimes
it was 11.00… They just send random
people round, is the best way of
describing it… They’re okay, it’s just that
you know [mum] says she wishes she
knew what time they were turning up and
she wishes she knew who was turning
up. Site 1, service user 3
Time and task-based approaches were widely 
seen as antithetical to person-centred support, 
as this person who uses care services put it: 
We haven’t done anything wrong, so why
are we imprisoned? Why are we left to
have only four hours of care a week? Or
15 minutes twice a day? That’s not social
care, that’s not social support, that’s not
even of any use to anyone. What’s the
point in having support with your
shopping, if when the shopping arrives
your care worker hasn’t got time to put
it away? Site 1, Service user 6 
The focus on local authority control means that 
even where forms of individual commissioning 
are used they may be subject to a high level of 
prescription and audit, which limit individual 
choice and control. 






















I think what happens is the social worker
does an assessment, and because
usually it’s complex needs, we will
suggest a number of providers. The
choice is really the choice provided to the
social worker, not the individual. Site 1,
local authority interviewee 2 
Although only one of the areas that we 
were working with had a prepayment card 
for direct payment holders, this is known 
to be increasing in prevalence as a way to 
re-establish local authority control over 
individual purchasing (In Control and 
Think Local Act Personal, 2019). 
Self-funders are not explicitly in view of the 
local authority in the procurement approach 
and indeed the scale of their existence and 
their characteristics remain largely unknown 
to local authorities, even though their fnancial 
contribution may be crucial to sustaining a 
multiplicity of providers in the care sector 
(CMA, 2017; Henwood, 2018). Many of the 
providers we interviewed set out the need to 
continue to gain funding from both the state 
and from self-funders to ensure their viability. 
Table 3 summarises the features of the 
procurement approach as we found it in 
the case sites. 
Many of the providers we interviewed set
out the need to continue to gain funding
from both the state and from self-funders
to ensure their viability.
Table 3: The procurement approach
Exemplar market shaping strategy Spot purchasing of time and task-based contracts. 
Logic 
Best way to get competitively priced care in a 
just-in-time way, adhering to minimum standards, 
avoiding waste, and satisfying the requirements of 
procurement law. 
Local authority attitudes 
Five sites were using this approach within part of their 
care market. 
Seen by some as a cost-effective way to quickly set 
up a care package. Felt by others to be driven by 
procurement departments and short-termism. 
It was most common in older people’s residential care. 
All sites had moved or were planning to move older 
people’s home care away from this model. 
Provider attitudes 
Unpopular model of commissioning due to lack 
of provider involvement in service design and 
short-termism. 
User attitudes 
Unpopular model of commissioning, due to perceived 
lack of choice; poor quality; unreliable service. 
Self-funders 
Not directly involved, but their cross-subsidy will be 
vital in some areas to ensuring provider viability. 
Personalised 
Minimal scope for choice and control 
for people using services. 
Integrated Integration is not addressed. 
Vibrant and sustainable market 
Lack of engagement with providers to stimulate 









4.2 Managed market –
high control, close relationships
The managed market approach is designed to 
secure suffciency of supply through the use of 
block and framework contracts with a small 
number of providers. 
Shaping the market through the managed 
market approach 
The managed market approach may mark the 
next phase of development in local authority 
market shaping approaches: fve of our local 
authority case sites had moved some of their 
sub-markets away from procurement-driven 
approaches to take a managed market
approach with a smaller number of providers. 
This approach was seen to offer advantages 
to both the local authority and providers, 
stabilising the market through guaranteed 
supply and facilitating rapid placements. In 
some sites, this had been done across a whole 
local authority area. In others, it was being done 
through a locality approach, in which providers 
were given guaranteed levels of hours within 
certain neighbourhoods – or in which a lead 
provider was appointed for an area who could 
sub-contract with other providers in a more 
fexible way. 
This approach offers clear advantages over 
the procurement model, allowing local 
authorities to develop closer relationships 
with a small number of providers. There is also 
scope to use the framework to support better 
integrated working with health. For example, 
one of the local authorities in our study had 
addressed delayed hospital discharge by block 
contracting with three providers specifcally to 
do reablement work after a hospital stay. This 
service was also offered to self-funders, and 
some had continued to use the same provider 
after the reablement period had expired. 
However, in sites that were transitioning into 
this model by shrinking down the number of 
home care providers, we found little refection 
by commissioners on the likely implications for 
self-funders of this change (which may drive 
out of business the providers that self-funders 
are also using). 




























































The managed market approach is premised on 
ensuring suffciency of supply. However, it 
had failed to do so in the fve local authorities 
that were using it: issues of undersupply of 
staff or provider withdrawal meant that 
frameworks did not deliver the anticipated 
market stability. As one commissioner put it: 
The intention was to try and take a
stronger approach of shaping the market,
by contracting agencies, rather than just
doing spot purchases for people all the
time. But trying to take that control back
hasn’t worked out as well as hoped. Site
7, local authority interviewee 4 
In this case, the attempt to establish a lead-
and sub-provider model had fallen through 
when both lead providers handed back their 
contracts due to diffculties recruiting staff. 
[T]hey appointed lead providers who
would be the overall lead in the area and
then they appointed market support
providers, which is what we are on one
of the locations. And then from that, we
would then absorb 30% and the lead
would absorb 70%. But both leads
pulled out. Site 7, provider 4 
A local authority using a framework contract to 
facilitate hospital discharge found that staff 
shortages at weekends inhibited the effective 
working of the contractual arrangements. In 
another area, which has taken a more 
locality-based approach to commissioning, 
one of the providers described diffculties in 
how it is working: 
Because fees aren’t really covering
the costs, [the neighbourhood] providers
tend to say no to that care… [T]hey can’t
deliver it within the fee level, so then
the local authority has to go to the
wider [framework], which is, ‘and other
providers in the local authority area’ who
quite often then are able to negotiate a
fee that they think they’ll be able to do
the work for. The commissioning
framework doesn’t really work in that
respect. Site 5, provider 1
Pressures on local authority capacity were 
particularly intense in areas with large 
self-funder markets where providers had 
other options and higher income streams: 
[W]e said to [the local authority] at that
time, we won’t be signing up to [the
framework], we’ll keep what we’ve got.
We’ve already been expanding our
self-funder market, and we want to
continue doing that. By doing that…
the fortunes of the business have turned
around quite considerably now. Site 5,
provider 10 
Areas with fewer self-funders and greater 
workforce availability encountered a different 
problem. Here, providers were complaining that 
not enough of the promised hours were being 
given to them: 
[T]hey work on a rota where there’s two
agencies in each locality roughly and
each week they’ll take everything that
goes that week. And if anything, [the
providers are] saying that they’re not
getting enough, rather than [too much]…
Site 4, local authority interviewee 3
In two of the sites, providers had been allocated
a neighbourhood and number of hours on the
framework, but had been able to increase this
by encouraging their existing clients from other
neighbourhoods to move onto a direct payment
and continue using their services. This approach
ensures continuity of provider (which may be a
positive outcome in relation to personalisation),
but it undermines the logic of the
neighbourhood commissioning approach, 
which is that providers get guaranteed hours in
their locality and plan their staffng accordingly.
A number of issues are at work here, all of 
which speak to the diffculties local authorities 
have in managing a market in which they are 
not the only commissioner and have limited 
control over the workforce. In more affuent 
sites, some providers were shifting to the 
self-funder market and capacity was limited 
as care staff were able to fnd better paid 
employment outside the sector. In less affuent 
sites, care providers lacked access to 
self-funder cross-subsidy and some were 
exiting the market altogether. 
In a number of sites, a further worry
for providers was that the local authority
couldn’t offer the long-term assurances that































One provider expressed their nervousness 
about local authority intentions to move to 
a lead- and sub-provider model: 
Well, you know the demand’s out  
there, it just depends what role you’re 
going to play. Will we be a leader in 
delivering that and subcontracting [other 
providers]? Or will we miss out and have 
to be subcontracted to someone else  
and how will that work out?  
Site 1, provider 2 
In a number of sites, a further worry for 
providers was that the local authority 
couldn’t offer the long-term assurances that 
were needed for investment, particularly in 
building-based services: 
What do they want? Where do they want
it? How much are they going to pay for
it? That all enables us to put our hands in
our pocket and invest in something…
Local authorities… think well, we’ll do
something for a couple of years, any
chance you could spend £3 million
building it? Well, you can’t build
something for £3 million and two years
later they change their mind. Site 2,
provider 1
Table 4: The managed market approach 
Framework contract, for whole borough or on a
Exemplar market shaping strategy 
neighbourhood basis. 
This approach emphasises sustainability but does not 
Vibrant and sustainable market seem to be matching supply and demand in the way 
that commissioners had anticipated. 
Stabilises the market through guaranteed supply and 
Logic 
facilitates rapid placements. 
Several sites had recently established new framework 
Local authority attitudes contracts for home care, but found this had not been 
as effective as hoped due to lack of provider capacity. 
Some providers unwilling to sign up to framework due 
Provider attitudes to low fees. Others were attracted by the guaranteed 
hours but not getting the expected demand. 
Users can be uncertain about how providers are 
User attitudes 
allocated to them. Choice may be limited. 
Not directly addressed. May inhibit choice through 
Self-funders 
shrinking the market. 
Personalised Limited provider choice for individuals. 
Can be used alongside other partners, eg, to improve 
Integrated 
hospital discharge. 
Personalisation in a managed market 
This approach aims at stabilising the 
market through reducing the overall number 
of commissioned providers and/or using a 
lead- and sub-provider model to combine 
suffciency of supply with fexibility. In the 
areas that were moving to this model, there 
was concern about its impact on choice 
of provider: 
The way they commission that service is
in geographical lots, so they will, I don’t
know, commission 5,000 hours of
domiciliary care for a borough… The
challenge really to the local authority, and
I’ve had this with various people in the
commissioning team is to say, ‘Well,
where is the choice there? That customer
has no choice, you decide and that’s a
given’. Site 3, provider 1 
One person (a self-funder), whose mother had 
used a provider allocated through a hospital 
discharge scheme, described her lack of 
choice in the process: 
Social services at the hospital said a care 
package needed to be put in place. [The 
care provider] employ assessors who 
work in the hospital to assess people’s 
needs and get people home… We 
weren’t given a choice of agency, we 
were just told we were having that one… 
Site 1, carer 6 
The scope for this model to enhance choice and
control is limited. The guaranteeing of hours to
providers, at the same time as purposefully
shrinking the number of commissioned services,
inhibits user choice. 


















4.3 Open market – low control,
distant relationships
In the open market approach, commissioning is 
done by the person using the service, through 
a direct payment, or other kind of individualised 
funding model. This is the approach to care 
commissioning promoted by the Putting People 
First Concordat (HM Government, 2007), in 
which support would primarily be accessed 
using a personal budget, within a structure of 
improved access to universal services. The role 
of the local authority here is to stimulate a 
diverse market of providers, including 
non-regulated providers such as personal 
assistants and micro-enterprises. By 
encouraging individuals to commission their 
own care, the aim is to enhance choice and 
control and minimise waste. Local authorities 
that are actively taking an open market
approach, facilitating diverse supply and 
individualised commissioning, are also likely 
to provide a conducive environment for 
self-funders, who are already acting as 
micro-commissioners on their own behalf. 
Shaping the market through the open 
market approach 
All of our sites were adopting some elements 
of an open market approach. This was 
particularly the case in support for working age 
people holding a direct payment. In some sites,
commissioners were explicit that this was not 
an approach that was appropriate for older 
people (despite clear sector guidance to the 
contrary): 
[P]articularly for older people, in my
experience, people just want to know
which service is local and if it’s a good
service that’s local, that’s fne. They don’t
necessarily want fve good services that
are local to choose from. Site 7, local
authority interviewee 1 
[T]he issues around an individual
employing a PA, for example, is just too
diffcult to manage, especially for an older




























































The proportion of people receiving direct 
payments, or part-direct payments, varied 
across the eight case study sites. The 
lowest proportion was a site where fewer 
than 10% of people accessing services were 
receiving a direct payment (either full or in 
part), compared to (at the higher end) a site 
where approximately 40% of people accessing 
long-term support received a direct payment 
(NHS Digital, 2018b). In most sites, 
a higher proportion of working age people 
(18–64 years) received a direct payment or 
part-direct payment than those aged 65 years 
or older. Across the sites, the proportion of 
working age people who received a direct 
payment, or part-direct payment, ranged 
between 12 and 60%. For those aged 65 
years and older, this ranged between 5 
to 40%. 
In sites with a higher proportion of direct 
payments, the development of an open 
market was a clear priority. It was seen 
as linking well to other strategies such as 
Personal Health Budgets and Integrated 
Personalised Commissioning. Respondents 
emphasised the importance of people being 
the active ‘integrators of their own care’, 
although some expressed concern about 
how far health commissioners understand 
the personalisation agenda. 
In other localities, local authority interviewees 
indicated that they had prioritised this model 
for several years after Putting People First 
when there had been strong national policy 
drivers, but that they had now drifted away 
from it. 
This type of market shaping requires 
commissioners to let relationships develop 
bilaterally between users and providers. As 
a provider put it: 
Local authorities have to get out of the
way and allow providers and service
users to develop the relationships
between them… [T]heir role simply
needs to be, ‘Is everything proceeding
as it should be? Is the customer happy,
healthy? In that case, that’s all we need
to know.’ Site 2, provider 3
However, this requirement to ‘get out of the 
way’ was something that many local authorities 
struggled with. 
[P]robably the most challenging bit is the
bit where we don’t actually commission
with those providers, so it’s shaping the
market that we don’t have a direct
relationship with. Site 4, local authority
interviewee 1 
In particular, there was uncertainty about what 
the role of the local authority should be in this 
type of market shaping: 
We’re still very much in the mind-set that
we’re the parent: we know all the
services, we know what are the best
ones, and we are the judges of quality.
Something I hear regularly is, ‘Well, you
know, what quality framework does that
third sector organisation follow?’ Well,
frankly, probably none. But does that
mean that all of their service is no good?
Quite often it doesn’t mean that, but the
risk aversion, the fear of being seen to
recommend or support a service that isn’t
quality-assured, that limits the ability of
the market to shape around social care
and health, in my opinion, because we
are too scared of what will happen if
someone has a bad experience and we
are somehow found to be accountable
for that. Site 8, local authority
interviewee 2 
The development of an open market was 
recognised to involve facilitation rather than 
simply assuming that supply would emerge 
to match demand. For example, one case 
study site had employed care coordinators 
who were tasked with proactively helping 
people fnd appropriate support, including 
community resources. 
[I]t’s meant having a coordinator out
there to help develop some of those
community businesses so people can go
there before they come to us, or they go
clutching their personal budget in
whatever form that takes and they can
buy what they need from the community
and they’re not coming into service land,
if you like, before they ought. Site 8, local
authority interviewee 2 
. . .  In the old days, there used to be
leafets. But now when we say, well, we
need information, we are often signposted
to online information websites. And we say
well, we haven’t got the computer skills.































Personalisation in an open market 
The open market approach is the one that 
most explicitly prioritises user choice and 
control. Many interviewees with direct 
payments reported positive experiences of 
being able to choose their own care, although 
they wanted much more local authority support 
and facilitation than they were currently getting.
The informal nature of the open market approach
often means that users and carers are left to
their own devices to fnd providers through word
of mouth. Personal assistants reported feeling
isolated, with a lack of formal structures to
match them to the people needing support: 
You’re left to struggle on your own. That’s
the only downside… Gumtree, I’ve used
the Job Centre. Word of mouth, yeah. 
Advertising in shops, newsagents, that
kind of thing. That’s the main ones I’ve
used. Site 1, personal assistant 2 
Self-funders similarly reported being left to fnd 
their way around providers with only a care 
directory to guide them. Carers reported the 
diffculties of operationalising choice where 
they are only given a list of providers – or told 
to look online: 
This [local authority] person said, ‘It’s 
online.’ I said, ‘Well, there’s a lot online.  
I want to be able to focus on this area’ 
 … He rather grudgingly sent this  
really un-useful list. It was sort of 30 
[agencies], and they were from all over. 
Site 6, carer 1 
In a group of family carers for young people
with disabilities, participants refected on the
diffculties of fnding information in a language
other than English, which had been exacerbated
by the move away from printed leafets: 
There has been a change in how
information is now conveyed to people.
In the old days, there used to be leafets.
But now when we say, well, we need
information, we are often signposted to
online information websites. And we say
well, we haven’t got the computer skills.
Site 1, Carer focus group, translated
from Urdu 
Table 5: Open market model 
Direct payments, Personal assistants, micro-
Exemplar market shaping strategy 
enterprises. 
Individuals can commission their own care to enhance 
Logic 
choice and control and minimise waste. 
Fits with personalisation but can be seen as risky due 
Local authority attitudes 
to lack of control over quality. 
Popular with some providers but can be seen as a 
threat to those on block/framework contracts, due 
Provider attitudes 
to perception of lack of a level playing feld around 
regulation. 
Works well for people who can commission their own 
User attitudes 
care but does need facilitation. 
Most self-funders already commission their own 
Self-funders care. They can beneft from the market diversity and 
facilitation. 
People can commission the support they want 
Personalised (subject to that being available, affordable and signed 
off by the local authority). 
Can ft into other initiatives such as Personal Health 
Integrated 
Budgets and Integrated Personalised Commissioning. 
Emphasises vibrancy of the market. Some 
respondents saw a trade-off between diversity 
Vibrant and sustainable market 
and sustainability, suggesting that the open market 




























4.4 Partnership – low control,
close relationships
In this approach, local authorities work with 
a small number of providers to co-design 
services and orient them to outcomes. This may 
also involve community co-design and a focus 
on asset-based approaches. The aim is to 
assure the long-term stability of the market, an 
appropriate service mix, and achievement of 
individual-level outcomes, which may include 
preventative interventions. 
Shaping the market through the partnership 
approach 
Four of our sites were undertaking approaches 
which ftted the partnership approach. In all 
eight of our sites, we found that this was a 
model that local authority commissioners 
aspired to move towards, feeling that it was 
consistent with the Care Act and likely to 
offer the combination of stability, quality and 
affordability that communities, providers and 
the local authority wanted. It could also create 
positive knock-on benefts for self-funders
if there is more investment in long-term, 
preventative services, or in effective reablement 
and a mixed supply of residential options like 
extra care housing. It is a model in which Care 
Act principles of integration and prevention 
can be embedded: 
We’ve got integrated neighbourhood
teams, teams who have knowledge of
their own locality and give support and
activities, which is available for all
individuals… We need to have
lower-level support service, like volunteer
drivers… befriending services, carer
services, you know. This is low-level
prevention, but this is really important,
bringing the voluntary sector involved
into… personalisation. Site 4, local
authority interviewee 5

















































Taking a more long-term approach was 
also welcomed: 
There used to be 30-odd, but there’s 
nine main providers in [our area] now. 
So, that gives you the economy of 
scale… which is good. And it’s a 
ten-year framework so it’s a long-term 
framework as long as each party is 
satisfed with each other, it allows you 
to put some real roots down, you know. 
Site 4, provider 3 
However, a number of authorities reported slow 
progress in moving in this direction, which they 
attributed in part to a lack of appetite for new 
ways of working amongst health partners or 
care providers: 
CCGs go into this kind of state where
the clinical stuff becomes supreme over
everything else and NICE guidance
becomes everything. And they can’t really
understand what else there is that they
need to think about and talk about.
Site 2, local stakeholder 1
I think if I was to go and do a tender
and say that I want an outcome-based
contract, [the providers] would have
absolutely no idea what I’m talking about
or where I’m starting from and I think
that’s because all of our care home
markets [are] kind of [small to medium
enterprises]. I think they’ll deliver really
good quality care, but they won’t
necessarily… understand, okay now, we
want to pay you based on the outcomes
that you deliver or even start talking about
outcomes framework, because I think
they would be… really lost. Site 7, local
authority interviewee 2
Another interviewee, from the voluntary sector, 
felt that local authorities themselves bear some 
of the blame for a lack of provider innovation: 
[A] lot of [local authorities] have the
providers that they deserve. They’re the
people who commissioned them over
[the] years, and so that’s what you’ve
got…They’re cut to the bone, they don’t
have any management… And now,
they’re saying to them in the new
contract, of course, well, actually what we
want you to do is something really totally
different. And we’re now going to start
paying you a little better. And the
homecare providers, of course, are
fnding it very hard to respond to that.
Site 2, local stakeholder 1 
In some areas, new payment models were 
being developed to enable providers and local 
authorities to gain mutual beneft from a 
reduction in service due to, for example, taking 
a more recovery-oriented approach in mental 
health services: 
…there’s a selection of outcomes that 
they [people using the mental health 
service] choose from and then with the 
support of the support worker and the 
care coordinator, or any other agencies 
that are involved, we’ll work together… to 
kind of move up the scale. Their package 
of hours will decrease, which means it 
will cost less and then that gap of savings 
is split 50/50 between ourselves and the 
local authority as a gains share.  
Site 1, provider 1 
However, in other areas, providers reported 
that commissioners were expecting outcomes-
based approaches without having changed 
their fnancial models: 
[Y]our aim is to get someone better, and 
reduce the amount of care, and get them, 
you know, out of the system and as 
independent as you possibly can down 
to a minimum level. You can’t then pay 
me based on the amount of time that I’m 
delivering, because the sole purpose of 
what I’m doing is to reduce the amount of 
time I’m spending with the individual and 
make them more independent.  
Site 2, provider 3 
Although the importance of wellbeing was 
recognised by commissioners in all of our 
sites, the cultural shift necessary to drive 
different market shaping processes was 
harder to achieve. One provider described 
it as the need to take a holistic approach, 
focused on overall wellbeing rather than 
the services and processes: 
It isn’t a service; there isn’t a service in
place. It’s about people leading activities,
people learning new skills, developing
people, sharing. And inevitably, it’s by
that networking, that connectedness, that
people’s health and wellbeing can
improve, people’s lives improve, people’s
employment rates can improve.
























Personalisation in a partnership approach 
The partnership model brings service-users 
and families into a dialogue with providers and 
commissioners about the outcomes that they 
seek to achieve. The model of choice and 
control here may be one in which provider 
choice is limited, but choice and control is 
maximised over how people want to be 
supported and spend their time. Through the 
opportunity to set out and achieve outcomes, 
people may transition into less reliance on paid 
support, and we did fnd examples of that: 
To put it bluntly, they’ve exceeded my
expectations in a way. They’ve helped me
get myself doing things that I wouldn’t
normally see myself doing… Not only has
it built my confdence up but also, they’ve
shown me what there really is out there.
Site 4, service user 9 
However, it is worth noting that not all the 
people we interviewed saw a reduction in 
service as a positive outcome. 
I mean, the council have tried to cut my
hours… my shopping down and my
washing and all that down to once every
two or three weeks, you know, but I put
up a bit of a stink and said I needed to
have my washing done every week.
Site 1, service user 4
This is a reminder that outcomes-oriented 
conversations, which may lead to a reduction 
in service, need to include the priorities of 
the person being supported and not be 
contractual conversations between 
commissioners and providers. 
Table 6: The partnership model 





Emphasis is on sustainability, this may be  
Vibrant and sustainable market 
at the expense of vibrancy/diversity. 
Assures the long-term stability of the market, 
Logic 
appropriate service mix, achievement of outcomes. 
Fits with personalisation but requires local authorities 
Local authority attitudes to trust providers and to have suffciently innovative 
providers. 
Popular with some providers due to long-term 
assurances, but can be a threat to others eg, where 
Provider attitudes 
fnancial incentives are not aligned with the new 
model. 
Offers scope for user-defned outcomes, which 
User attitudes 
might include reduction in formal services. 
May beneft from development of services for 
Self-funders the broader population, eg, relating to prevention 
or housing. 
Can be outcomes-driven in terms of commissioning 
Personalised (although those outcomes may be set by 
commissioners) and data-driven. 
Scope for population-level planning with health 
Integrated 
and other partners. 
[A] lot of [local authorities] have the
providers that they deserve. They’re the
people who commissioned them over
[the] years, and so that’s what you’ve
got… They’re cut to the bone, they
don’t have any management…




































Part 5: Linking market shaping
to costs and outcomes
Two key questions to consider in examining 
different models of market shaping are: what 
are their associated costs; and what difference 
– if any – do they make to individual outcomes? 
We aimed to better understand what costs 
were generated by market shaping and the 
extent to which different approaches to market 
shaping generate different outcomes for people 
using services and for carers. As we discuss 
below, both identifying costs and attributing 
outcomes proved diffcult and we weren’t able 
to draw clear conclusions about cost-
effectiveness from our data. 
The following data sources are discussed in 
this section: 
n    Local Authority Revenue Account  
Budget: Adult Social Care 
n    Interviews with commissioners 
n    Client Service Receipt Inventory (resource 
use) data from people using services 
n    ASCOT, ICECAP and EQ-5D data on 
outcomes from people using services  
and carers 
We looked at (i) what local authorities consider 
to be the costs of market shaping; (ii) whether 
there is a difference in resource use (eg, 
healthcare visits) depending on which of the 
four models of market shaping is being used; 
(iii) whether user outcomes are patterned by 
the type of market shaping in their locality. 
There are two returns relating to market 
shaping activity in the Adult Social Care 
section of the annual Local Authority Revenue 
Account Budget, and we began with these as a 
measure of market shaping activity, given that it 
allows comparison between sites and over time 
in two categories (a) Information and Early 
Intervention and (b) Commissioning and 
Service Delivery. 
However, the volatility of this data proves an 
unreliable measure of activity. Some sites had  
a zero return for one of these categories, whilst 
others showed high levels of variability 
between years. When the data was sense-
checked with commissioners in the sites, the 
return was described as something ‘done by 
fnance’ and not a reliable guide to spending 
on market shaping. 
A second data source was interviews with 
commissioners in the eight sites, in which we 
asked what costs were incurred by the market 
shaping duty. Here we found substantial 
variance across the eight sites in relation to 
what was included in market shaping. Some 
focused on staff costs: 
There isn’t a lot of cost that’s actually
external to offcer time. Site 3, Local
authority interviewee 1
Others interpreted market shaping as a much 
broader category of activity and expenditure: 
Your market shaping activity is everything
other than your actual spend on services.
Site 8, Local authority interviewee 1
It’s not just about revenue costs for social
care, we’re talking about capital costs.
Site 6, Local authority interviewee 1 
You’ve got the impact of things like the
Better Care Fund and stuff like that… 
which you could say has got large
elements of market shaping in it because
it’s actually across the health and social
care footprint. Site 8, Local authority
interviewee 1 
Some challenged the notion that it was 
possible to disaggregate market shaping 
activity from broader social care spend: 
It would be much more diffcult to
separate that out… It’s sort of part of
everything we do. Site 3, Local authority
interviewee 1
Interviewees had mixed perceptions when 
asked about whether the market shaping duty 
had increased or decreased local authority 
costs since the Care Act: 
I don’t think it costs any more… It’s just
doing it differently… it’s just about best
use of our resources really. Site 1, Local
authority interviewee 1
By doing the market shaping and
engaging with the market in the long run,
it’s actually more cost-effective to us
because we end up buying services that
are right rather than the services that we
think we need in the way we think we
need them. Site 7, Local authority
interviewee 2 
The cost of it is not on my radar because
that’s not important, it’s got to be done,
you know, it’s non-negotiable. Site 8,











   
These qualitative responses highlighted the 
diffculties of identifying discrete market 
shaping activities and costs. The fndings 
were discussed with the commissioners from 
each site who engaged in the peer-learning 
exercise. In particular, participants were asked 
to consider the likely differential spread of 
costs of undertaking one of the four types of 
market shaping (recognising that in practice 
most sites were utilising a combination of the 
four). The expected ratios of spending on 
different market shaping activities are shown 
in Table 7 below. It indicates that the ‘distant 
relationship’ approaches (procurement and 
open market) are seen as likely to have the 
lowest costs across all categories, largely 
because they are more short-term and require 
less senior staff involvement. The managed 
market and partnership were seen as incurring 
higher costs in most categories. 
Box 1 shows the results of analysing the 
individual survey responses to assess 
resource use and individual outcomes of 
people using services and family carers in the 
eight sites. Interview participants were asked 
to complete an adapted version of the Client 
Service Receipt Inventory (CSRI) to collect 
resource use relating to health and social care 
use, and two outcome measures: the Adult 
Social Care Outcomes Toolkit (ASCOT) and 
the ICECAP-A. Respondents were assigned 
to one of the four models, based on how their 
‘sub-market’ in that locality had been coded 
(as shown in Figure 4 on page 17). Given the 
relatively small sample size (we received 
baseline and follow up data from 49 service 
users and 54 carers) for each model, this part 
of the study combined the four models into two 
pairs – the ‘low control’ models (open market 
and partnership) which the stakeholder 
interviews indicated were compatible with 
the underlying principles of the Care Act, and 
the ‘high control’ models (procurement and 
managed market) which the stakeholder 
interviews suggested were not compatible with 
the Care Act. Interview participants, recruited 
through the snowball approach described 
earlier, were asked to complete outcome and 
resource use data at baseline (face-to-face 
interview) and at six-month follow-up (primarily 
through postal methods). Costs were 
categorised as healthcare costs, social care 
costs or informal care time.1 Quality of life 
measures were ICECAP-A score; ASCOT 
Social Care Related Quality of Life and 
EQ-5D score.2 
1 Informal care was valued using the proxy good method 
(van den Berg et al., 2004). 
2 The EQ-5D score was estimated from ASCOT using a 
recently published methodology (Stevens et al., 2018). 
Table 7: Comparing expected local authority spending level on the four types of market shaping
Procurement Managed market Open market Partnership Rationale 
‘For the following activities, please indicate whether you would expect spending in each column to be low, medium or high relative to each other’ 
Provider 
engagement 
LOW MEDIUM LOW HIGH 
Building relationships is key to the partnership approach, 





LOW MEDIUM LOW HIGH 
Coproduction and co-design is particularly a feature of the 
partnership model, although may also be used in shaping 
framework contracts under managed market. 
Tendering/ 
Contracting
HIGH HIGH LOW MEDIUM 
High control approaches require tight specifcation of 
contracts. In other approaches, formal contracting is less 




HIGH HIGH LOW HIGH 
All types (apart from open market) require high levels of 
oversight, although partnership is a learning/adaptive 
approach with providers rather than a monitoring process. 
Use of data LOW MEDIUM LOW HIGH 
In partnership model, long-term planning, based on good 





LOW LOW HIGH MEDIUM 
Users have most choice in the open market model and 
require IAA to navigate that. In partnership model, IAA 





LOW LOW HIGH LOW 
The open market model prioritises individualised funding 
which may require brokerage and support. 
Integration 
with health 
LOW MEDIUM LOW HIGH 
Working closely with health system is most evident in the 
partnership model. 

















































































The data summarised in Box 1 suggests that
the Care Act-compatible commissioning models
(open market and partnership) may be linked to
higher resource use than the non-compatible
models (procurement and managed market).
Not all of these costs will be incurred by the
local authority (the sample includes self-funders
and the CRSI includes health as well as care
costs), but it may explain the continued appeal
of the procurement and managed market models
to local authorities. A limitation on this data is
that there was wide variance in spend per
individual given that we recruited a diverse
sample of people with different levels of health
and care needs. It is not clear why there is
higher reliance on informal care in the open
market and partnership models. Since they are
‘low control’ models, there may be a greater
need for families to work with providers to
purchase care or agree outcomes. The
improvement in quality of life between baseline
and follow-up for people using the open market
and partnership models, may suggest that these
models offer a better ft over time for people than
the ‘high control’ options which are subject to
local authority specifcation.
These inferences have to be heavily caveated,
given the small sample size (particularly for the
follow up survey), the variance in care spend per
individual and the diffculties of attributing costs
and outcomes to market shaping activity, which
our qualitative work showed does not have the
characteristics of an ‘intervention’, and in which
there are many intervening variables which
inhibit causal relationships. We conclude that
assessment of the cost-effectiveness of market
shaping is likely to remain elusive, and that
commissioners would do better to see different
types of market shaping as facilitative of
interventions which themselves can be assessed
for cost-effectiveness (eg, the provision of Extra
Care Housing as part of a partnership approach
(Holland et al., 2015)). 
In the fnal section of the report, we consider
how best to bring together the approaches that
are most compatible with the Care Act – the
open market and partnership types of market
shaping – recognising that both are likely to be
needed in a locality, but that potential tensions
between them need to be addressed. 
Box 1: Summary Findings from the Resource Use and Individual Outcomes Analysis
Overall, total costs were slightly higher in the Care Act-compatible group, ie, for people
in the sub-markets classed as open market or partnership compared to those in the
non-Care Act compatible group (people classed as in procurement or managed market
sub-markets). (See table A1 in the Appendix).
Mean total costs, measured over a three-month period, were £1,361 per service-user in
this open market/partnership group at baseline, compared to £1,112 per service-user in
the procurement/managed market group.
At six-month follow-up, costs increased for both groups; mean total cost per service-user
was £1,510 in the Care Act-compatible group compared to £1,334 per service-user in
the non-compatible group. The size of the difference in mean total costs between the two
groups decreased from baseline to follow-up (£249 vs. £175), however, this difference
was not statistically signifcant at either time point.
At baseline, the most sizeable difference in costs was in informal care, with this being
higher in the Care Act-compatible group. There was a £663 difference in mean costs of
informal care and this was the only statistically signifcant difference in the broad cost
categories at baseline.
Average quality of life (QoL) scores did not differ much between service-users within
the two groups (table A2 in the Appendix). At baseline, QoL scores were slightly higher
in the non-Care Act compatible pair (procurement/management market) compared to the
Care Act-compatible group (open market/partnership). However, at follow-up, this pattern
was reversed.
QoL scores were higher at follow-up than they were at baseline across all three
measures for the Care Act-compatible group. However, for the non-compatible group,
QoL scores were lower than they were at baseline across all three measures.
For carers, mean QoL scores were typically lower at follow-up than they were at
baseline for both groups. This was with the exception of mean ICECAP-A score in the
Care Act-compatible group, which was slightly higher at follow-up than at baseline (0.640
vs. 0.626).
When baseline and follow-up scores were used to generate QALY (Quality-Adjusted
Life Years) changes for the three outcome measures, differences between the two pairs























































Part 6: Getting the
best of both worlds
All of the sites in our study were in transition, 
moving between the four parts of the market 
shaping typology as they sought to discharge 
their duties more effectively. One of the 
elements we looked at in the research was 
why local authorities were moving in 
particular directions, or were stuck in a model 
of market shaping that they recognised to be 
sub-optimal. We developed this section of the 
report through the peer-learning exercise 
where we shared the four-part typology with 
commissioners from our case sites. This 
offered a ‘member check’ to validate our 
fndings and scope to test out emerging 
recommendations (Koelsch, 2013). 
Several interviewees talked about having 
moved from a procurement to a managed 
market to an open market approach, and 
then either now attempting to move to the 
partnership approach, or going back to the 
managed market to regain greater control 
over the market. One local authority 
interviewee described the rationale for 
retreating from the open market: 
Everyone jumped on choice means
more… more provision and more
providers and you got all these
organisations set up to kind of hit that… 
Actually, it diluted a market and… I think
it’s created unsustainable business
models at the moment actually. So, we’re
looking to kind of reverse that a little bit…
Site 1, local authority interviewee 1 
A provider refected on watching the 
progression from open market back to 
a managed market: 
Other local authorities in [the region]
have gone very hard down the individual
budgets route, which is great. Again, if
it’s accompanied by stimulation of the
market to deliver what those people want
to buy, but they’re also now starting to
kind of retract that offer a little bit.
They’re… starting to look back at
commissioning blocks of service rather
than allowing people to make their own
decisions. That seemed counter-intuitive
to me and… it goes against some of the
stuff that we’ve been trying to do within
our services to kind of liberate people
and say, ‘You do have a choice, you don’t
have to do, you don’t have to purchase
this particular service’. Site 3, provider 1
Some local authorities were purposefully 
deploying different market shaping 
strategies in different sub-markets, but 
in others, there was a tendency to drift 
between quadrants as the limits of one 
became apparent. 
There was little refection on how the different 
market shaping approaches interacted with 
each other. For example, several sites were 
seeking to combine a managed market with an 
open market approach in home care – working 
with established providers at the same time as 
stimulating micro-enterprises and personal 
assistant provision. However, this was 
antagonising some of the framework providers 
because of a perception of double standards: 
The reaction from the traditional service
providers has been very mixed… One
of the fears for providers is that it’s an
attempt to kind of dismantle the current
structure of the market and give people
more choice. In so doing, undercutting
traditional providers because micro-
providers aren’t subject to the same
regulatory control, so their costs are
lower. Site 5, provider 1 
This response highlights the importance of 
working with providers to communicate the 
different contexts and advantages of being 
located within either the open market or 
partnership approaches. It also requires clarity 
about the rationale for regulatory approaches 
being different. Local authorities need to be 
able to work with the CQC and national 
policy-makers to articulate for providers and 
for people using services why ‘open market’
providers operate with less regulatory scrutiny 
than other providers. There also needs to be 
recognition by the CQC of the implications of 
partnership working for regulatory oversight: 
Our delivery models include… health
and wellbeing workers, housing advisors.
But, that didn’t ft sort of CQC. How do
you contract with that? Well, we don’t.
We work together differently. Yeah but,
who’s responsible for that? So, if you’ve
got a housing input into a wider health
and care provision, they couldn’t get
their heads [a]round… whether that
was appropriately regulated or not.
Site 4, local stakeholder 2 












































Barriers to working in the partnership and
open market approaches may also come from
within the council. In the peer-learning exercise,
several commissioners discussed how they
had experimented with partnership approaches
– including co-designing approaches with
providers and other stakeholders – but had
to abandon this approach due to internal
resistance from legal and procurement
teams and an inclination to emphasise contract
price. Excessive focus on contractual terms and
conditions led to provider caution and fear of
breaching the rules. Despite these issues, the
participants in the peer-learning exercise agreed
with the imperative to combine an open
market with a more long-term partnership
approach, in order to get ‘the best of both
worlds’. Together, these approaches offer scope
to support self-funders in different ways, and
also to respond to demographic diversity
amongst people using care services. However,
there are tensions between these models which
need to be openly discussed and managed.
Both of the approaches require suffciency
of supply and demand. Both offer ways to 
incentivise providers to enter and stay in 
the market, either through lowering barriers to
entry and increasing micro-commissioning (open
market) or by providing long-term stability and
the opportunity to co-design new approaches
(partnership). Potential risks of adopting both
models side-by-side include so-called
‘cannibalisation’ between the two: will local
authorities discourage direct payments and an
open market if they have heavily invested in a
long-term partnership approach? Alternatively,
does the commitment to personalisation and
micro-commissioning mean that partners will
not get the security of demand that they need
to invest in staff and facilities? We found
evidence of both types of confict in our case
sites. In Table 8 we set out some of the
distinguishing elements of the two models and
how they can potentially complement but also
clash with each other: 











Open market Partnership 
Rules Low contract specifcation by LAs 
Distant relationships between a large number of Close relationships between a small number 
Relationships 
providers and local authority. of providers and local authority. 
Measurable outcomes are set by commissioners 
Outcomes are decided by individuals using services, 
Outcomes and providers. Providers may then work with users
and signed off by social worker/care manager. 
to identify their individual outcomes. 
Key role of local authority is in providing information Key role of local authority is co-designing services
Local authority role and advice, stimulating the market and possibly with providers and communities, creating opportunities
providing some quality assurance. for learning. 
Risk Higher risk for providers. Lower risk for providers. 
Indirectly helps self-funders who already operate in May enhance self-funder access to a broader
Self-funders 
this space. range of services, eg, prevention, housing. 
May reduce individual choice of provider but 
Promotes personalisation, choice and control, building 
Personalisation can create opportunities for services to be better 
on existing direct payment support. 
oriented to individual outcomes. 
Can stimulate provision of small, culturally appropriate Large providers may be able to employ a diverse 
Diversity 
providers for communities. staff base to support culturally diverse needs. 
Suitable for building-based services and other 
Suitable for people who can commission their own 
Target group high-investment projects; recovery-oriented 
























































The skill-sets and relationships are different 
in these two models so care needs to be 
taken in combining them. Supporting open 
markets requires commissioners to have 
an entrepreneurial understanding of the 
market, including how to stimulate market 
entry, and how to support individuals, families 
and providers to manage the risk and 
complexity of individualised commissioning. 
The partnership approach requires building 
trust with providers and communities over the 
long-term, which may reduce individual choice 
of provider but enable people to make choices 
in relation to how their outcomes are achieved. 
The next two sections look at two elements of 
this: trust and outcomes. 
Building Trust 
The partnership approach requires high levels 
of trust between commissioners and providers, 
and a willingness to design the market for the 
long-term. On the whole, we found low levels 
of trust between commissioners and providers 
in all our sites. As this commissioner put it: 
Fundamentally it’s trust… Particularly
fnancially if we’re saying ‘yes we’ll give
you that pot of money for that group of
customers, here’s x per year, just meet all
their needs, we trust you to do that’, but
we don’t… We want to measure it. We
don’t quite trust that those outcomes will
be met for that money unless we can see
what’s been delivered minute by minute.
Yeah and then it becomes a bureaucratic
nightmare! We want to change things but
carry on measuring it in the old way,
because we’re so paranoid. Site 8, Local
authority interviewee 4
This local voluntary sector leader highlights the 
problems on both sides in relation to trust and 
transparency: 
What [the local authority] do is they buy
something… they monitor it, tell the
organisation off for not doing it properly… 
The organisation itself (and I’ve been on
the other side of this), we just tell the
commissioner whatever it is that we think
they need to hear to get them off our
back. Why would we do anything else... 
because they are judging us on that
monitoring, the monitoring doesn’t make
any sense. Because they haven’t really
understood what it is they’re monitoring a
lot of the time. Site 2, local stakeholder 1 
Several local authorities expressed concern 
about risks of proft-extraction by large 
providers if more public money comes into the 
system. Some were unsure about the business 
models of some of their providers: 
You don’t understand how their business
is structured. You don’t understand the
business that that overhead exists in. So,
you don’t know whether they’ve got a
mortgage on an owned property, whether
they’re renting, the local rental fees. Site 4,
local authority interviewee 2 
One local authority had worked with providers 
on a more transparent basis to help understand 
their context and business model, and to 
improve staff wages: 
We did a bit of work with those providers
to understand, ‘Okay, what kind of
structure of a company are you? What’s
your proft margins? What can you really
afford? What can you not?’ On the whole,
they were small, independent or
sub-regional organisations that could
demonstrate that, if we provided them with
extra money, that would be passed on
directly to staff… Site 3, local authority
interviewee 1 
From the provider perspective, a key barrier 
to trust was the high turnover of local authority 
commissioners, care managers and social 
workers, which inhibits communication, 
continuity and a coherent organisational 
long-term strategy. Commissioners themselves 
recognised that they often do not project a 
clear and consistent market shaping strategy 
that is needed to allow trust to develop: 
When you talk about market management,
market shaping, whatever you want to call
it nowadays, I don’t think we know what
we want and we’re not communicating it
and it’s not clear, which doesn’t bode well
for many local providers, small or large, to
think about the work they’re doing. Site 1,
local authority interviewee 9 


























It was also clear that in some cases, providers 
may not trust other providers and that this 
was contributing to the vulnerability of 
approaches such as lead and sub-provider 
models. 
So when you’re in a formalised
procurement exercise, you know, basically
we don’t even ask who they are in the
room because some organisations don’t
want to give that information over… Even
things which are less formalised, providers
will sort of either use it as a sales pitch,
even though it’s not part of the
procurement exercise, or become very
very reticent to actually be open about
what’s happening for them and what
works and whatever – because they have
people round that table who might be
bidding against them in six months’ time.
Site 6, local authority interviewee 1 
To outcomes and beyond 
There was a sense in several of our case 
sites that commissioning for outcomes via 
partnerships was the desired destination of 
their market shaping approaches. However, 
there were a number of barriers to this, 
particularly in a low trust setting. Early 
experiments with outcomes-based 
commissioning have encountered some of 
these problems and suggest that moves to 
partnership arrangements require iterative 
adjustment rather than ‘big bang’ approaches 
(Bolton, 2019). Bolton argues that there should 
be realistic expectations of the time it may 
take to develop agreements to support 
outcomes-based commissioning and that 
continuing discussions between all parties 
are needed. Providers should not be held 
solely to account for the outcomes achieved. 
Instead, all parties should work together to 
consider why certain targets may have been 
met and others have not, recognising that in 
complex systems attribution is diffcult to 
establish. There needs to be scope for learning 
and adaptation, ‘using monitoring data for 
refection, rather than target-based 
performance management’ and fostering a 
‘positive error’ culture (Lowe and Plimmer, 
2019, p.19). 
So it’s no longer us saying, ‘This is what
we want. Off you go, go and do it.’ It’s
more about how do we as commissioners
and you as the provider work together to
deliver these outcomes but also drive up
quality and drive down costs. Site 7, local
authority interviewee 2 
There needs also to be an awareness of the 
limits of defning outcomes in functional 
terms. Good care which supports the Care 
Act principle of wellbeing is relational: good 
relationships between the people giving and 
receiving care are one of the outcomes that are 
valued most (Lewis and West, 2014; Eldh et 
al., 2016; Needham et al., 2017). Sustained 
relationships are also essential to building 
trust with communities so that local 
communities do not see a reduction in service 
as a violation of their entitlements. However, 
this can only succeed where there is a 
comprehensive asset-based and strengths-
based approach to developing and linking 
community resources alongside care and 
support service provision (Tew et al., 2019). 
This then raises the importance of co-design 
and co-production with people using services, 
families and broader communities as well as 
providers so that care services support 
broader wellbeing. 
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The aspirations of the Care Act to improve 
market shaping and support personalised 
outcomes were endorsed by the people who 
took part in our study. There was no sense that 
the legislation was unhelpful or out of date. 
Rather, participants noted a disjuncture 
between the aspirations of the Act and the 
practices in localities. The complexity of local 
care markets makes market shaping a complex 
and fractured activity. There are multiple 
sub-markets in operation within a local 
authority. As local authorities attempt to shape 
them, their activities overlap with those of other 
commissioners (health authorities, neighbouring 
boroughs, self-funders and direct payment 
holders). The elements that underpin effective 
care markets – notably, long-term funding 
confdence, stability of providers, high-trust 
relationships with and between providers, 
choice and control for people using services 
– were not strongly evident in any of the sites. 
Instead, we found the case sites drifting 
between types of market shaping, often solving 
one issue but generating another. Market 
shaping has not been done in a purposeful 
way, and has lacked recognition of 
interdependencies between different 
market shaping models. 
In the report, we have set out a four-fold 
typology of approaches to market shaping, 
all of which are being used by local authorities. 
National stakeholder interviewees told us that 
low control approaches, which we separated 
into open market and partnership, were the 
most likely to support the personalisation 
and wellbeing aspirations of the Care Act. 
‘High control’ approaches (which we termed 
procurement and managed market), 
undermine the scope for innovation and 
trust which support personalised outcomes. 
The national interviewees highlighted the 
advantages of both distant and close 
relationships between local authorities
and the market: the open market (distant
relationships) maximises diversity and
choice, whereas the partnership approach
(close relationships) helps to secure
long-term stability and an outcome focus. 
In local sites, we found support for this 
positioning. Procurement approaches
minimised scope for providers to innovate, 
pushed down quality and offered no choice 
and control for people using services. 
Managed market approaches were being 
used to stabilise the market but were stifing 
choice and were not able to match supply 
and demand in the way that was hoped. 
Open market approaches offered scope for 
innovation and choice, but were not being 
facilitated in a way that helped people with 
the risk and complexity of the open market. 
The partnership approach was popular with 
local authorities and providers but diffcult 
to operationalise given funding constraints, 
high local authority turnover and 
workforce shortages. 
Attention should focus on how local authorities 
can be supported to develop a combination 
of open market and partnership 
approaches. This combination facilitates the 
development of close relationships with a 
group of providers while also allowing other 
providers to enter the market, and therefore 
has the potential to maximise choice for 
people accessing services. 
There are strong pressures pushing local 
authorities towards the open market and 
partnership approaches that are compatible 
with the Care Act. Providers, people using 
services and carers, other local and national 
stakeholders, and key sector bodies (eg, SCIE, 
Think Local Act Personal) all advocate the 
‘low control’ approaches, albeit in different 
combinations. However, these two approaches 
(open market and partnership) require local 
authorities to cede control, and the diffcult 
fnancial circumstances in which they fnd 
themselves alongside the statutory need to 
meet care needs, is a countervailing force 
pulling them towards the high control 
approaches (procurement and managed 
market). Rising demand, constraints on public 
spending, insuffcient staffng, weak consumer 
power and poor fows of information can steer 
local authorities towards forms of market 
shaping which stabilise care markets in 
their current form rather than moving to 
more person-centred approaches. There is a 
perceived trade-off between individual choice 
and market stability, and local authorities don’t 
necessarily have the capacity and skills in 
market management and foresight planning 
to address this tension. 
Designing local rules in ways that enhance 
diversity and choice rather than reduce it, 
combining the open market model or the 
partnership model, should be the aim. 
Partnership models are best pursued in 
an iterative way to build trust, enable 
providers, service-users, families and
communities to adapt, and to see the effects 
of changes (including on self-funders and other 
commissioning partners such as health). Doing
this well is more than a technical commissioning
role – it requires relational skills and the acumen
to build trust and learning within complex local
systems. Open markets already exist in many
areas but are fragile and need active local
authority facilitation to work effectively. The mix
of open market and partnership approaches
requires local authorities to combine two sets
of strategies and behaviours, and for national
policy and regulatory requirements to support
such endeavours.
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7.1 Recommendations 
Local authority commissioners need to: 
1. Make purposive and strategic decisions  
in their approach to market shaping. The 
typology developed by this project can  
be used to recognise the nuance and 
interconnectedness of social care market 
shaping. Whilst local authorities may be 
using all four approaches in the short-term to 
ensure continuity of supply, commissioners 
should be looking to stimulate the open 
market and partnership approaches. 
2. Develop partnership models. Local 
authorities need to use forms of 
commissioning that foster trust, 
transparency and long-term investment and 
allow communities to be part of a co-design 
process. This is likely to require more 
open-book accounting, pooling of data and 
a willingness to share the risks of innovation. 
Achieving personalised outcomes requires 
sensitivity to the wide range of outcomes 
that people want from care and support  
and will require considerable fexibility and 
scope for variation in the support provided, 
as well as sensitivity to the diffculties of 
measuring and attributing outcomes in 
complex systems. 
3. Facilitate the open market model. Local 
authorities also need to stimulate the 
emergence of a diverse range of providers 
and personal assistants, and help to match 
them with people who want to access 
support in this way (including self-funders), 
ensuring quality assurance processes are 
proportionate to the level of risk involved. 
Smaller providers and personal assistants 
may require help with business support and 
relevant care regulations. 
4. Be explicit about making different offers 
to different parts of the market. Existing 
providers may be hostile to the stimulation 
of an open market of PAs and unregulated 
micro-providers if this feels like a lack of a 
‘level playing feld’. The partnership 
approach offers long-term investment on  
a co-design and learning basis, which is 
likely to be of interest to established 
providers – and can be combined with  
the open market, so long as the tensions 
between the two approaches are discussed 
and managed. 
5. Recognise self-funders and direct 
payment holders as co-commissioners 
of care: changes to the size and shape  
of care markets will have signifcant 
implications for people who commission 
their own care. Local authorities need to 
anticipate and understand these impacts, 
and work to ensure that individuals and 
families are able to navigate the market. At 
the same time, the actions and choices of 
individuals (especially self-funders) have 
implications for the wider local care market; 
failing to take account of the cumulative 
impact of individualised commissioning will 
constrain local authorities’ understanding  
of their care markets and their ability to 
shape them. 
6. All of these elements require support  
and training. There are many existing 
tools available to support local authority 
market shaping (for example, the LGA/ 
DHSC/ADASS’s Commissioning for 
Better Outcomes framework and 
Integrated Commissioning for Better 
Outcomes and resources from the Institute 
of Public Care). There is also a number  
of improvement initiatives within the sector, 
such as the LGA’s Peer Challenge scheme 
and the CQC’s Local System Reviews. 
However, limited local authority capacity 
and high staff turnover in commissioning 
has made it diffcult to make effective use of 
these resources and has impeded long-term 
relationship building with external 
stakeholders. 
Commissioning for market shaping requires: 
i. Recruiting for the right values and skills 
within commissioning teams, recognising 
that effective commissioners require a 
combination of technical and relational 
capabilities. 
ii. Training on the relational and 
entrepreneurial aspects of the role as  
well as on the legal and technical aspects. 
Resources such as the 21st Century 
Public Servant framework are available 
which offer this broader focus. 
iii. Creating opportunities to build trust 
between local authority staff (encompassing 
procurement/legal teams as well as 
commissioners) and external stakeholders 
to facilitate co-design. 
iv. Supporting staff retention in 
commissioning roles, recognising that trust 
is a long-term asset, and is diffcult to 
sustain with a rapidly changing workforce 
v. Developing the market shaping capacities 
of elected members. Their broader 
strategic role in local authorities means that 
they must be part of any new approach. 
Some of this support could be located at a 
regional level. Peckham et al.’s evaluation  
of the Care Act Implementation Programme 
highlighted how much local authorities valued 
the role of a regional coordinator within that 
programme. Some regions are already offering 
commissioner training which could be further 
developed. Where the focus is on building 
local relationships (within and beyond the 
local authority) this will need to be done at  
a smaller scale. 
These activities need to be funded  
through dedicated new resources. The 
Commissioning Support Programme for 
Children’s Services could provide a useful 
template for such an approach, as it evaluated 
well and was found to have ‘made a positive 
contribution to developing the skills and 





























Action at the local level has to be 
complemented by national policy change. 
DHSC funding for Care Act preparedness and 
national resources/toolkits have been helpful to 
the sector, but the Act cannot be the basis for 
effective market shaping and personalisation 
without action on other aspects of the national 
care system, which are not the direct focus of 
this report:
1. Securing the adequacy of funding in 
the social care system, moving beyond 
short-term allocations that inhibit effective 
planning and partnerships. Market shaping 
requires stability and investment over the 
long-term. 
2. Increasing capacity in the care workforce. 
This is a key concern among local 
authorities and providers, and requires 
a national strategy, alongside local action. 
3. Ensuring the regulatory system is 
proportionate and responsive to both open 
market and partnership approaches, with a 
clear rationale for which parts of the system 
need to be regulated and which do not. 
Overall, this research suggests that there is 
great potential and local appetite to develop 
partnership and open market approaches – but 
that this is very diffcult without secure funding 
and a stable policy settlement. Shaping 
care markets cannot be the job of a heroic 
lone commissioner but requires a sustained 
commitment by all stakeholders to deliver 
the Care Act’s radical ambition of 
improving wellbeing. 
For more information on the project,





or contact Professor Catherine Needham, 
c.needham.1@bham.ac.uk. 
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Appendix – Detailed fndings
from economic analysis 
Sampling process
for economic evaluation 
Eight local authorities (LAs) were selected 
to represent LAs in geographical spread; 
prevalence of self-funding; political control 
and authority type. The sample LAs comprised 
social care users who receive LA funding 
(eg, managed personal budgets or direct 
payments), and self-funders. Service-users 
were recruited through providers to refect 
the breakdown of users nationally. Carers 
were recruited through local community 
organisations. 
Outcome measures 
Social care-related outcomes were measured 
using ASCOT (Adult Social Care Outcomes 
Toolkit) and ICECAP-A in interviews (care 
recipients) and focus groups (carers). 
Respondents completed measures via postal 
survey at six-month follow-up. From ICECAP-A, 
years of full capability and years of suffcient 
capability were calculated. The difference 
between YFC and YSC is that full capability (ie, 
scoring of 44444) is substituted with suffcient 
capability (eg, scoring of 33333). The latter 
corresponds to individuals reporting that they 
have at least ‘a lot’ of capability for each 
domain, as opposed to full capability across all 
domains (as in YFC). To calculate YSC, the 
original values of ICECAP-A are rescaled so 
that 1 is equal to the threshold of suffcient 
capability (scoring of 33333). ICECAP-A and 
ASCOT (service user) data were scored using 
UK tariffs to generate scores on a 0-1 scale. 
Resource use 
An adapted version of the Client Service 
Receipt Inventory (CSRI) collected resource 
use relating to health and social care use, 
valued using published national unit costs and 
NHS Reference Costs. To value the costs 
of informal care, the proxy good method was 
used. This information was collected as part 
of the questions to both service-users and 
carers and enabled the valuation of time losses 
following this methodology. 
Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted to
determine baseline differences between the
sample LAs. Parametric (independent samples
t-test) and non-parametric (Fisher’s exact test;
x2-test; Mann-Whitney U-test) were conducted
to compare socio-demographics (age and
gender), social-care related quality of life (mean
ASCOT scores), capability (mean ICECAP-A
scores), and resource use at baseline between
sites. Signifcant differences were controlled for
using ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple
regressions to adjust for baseline characteristics
in all tests of differences in costs and outcomes.
Economic evaluation 
Mean ICECAP index scores were calculated 
at baseline and follow-up for intervention and 
control groups. YFC and YSC were then 
estimated using the standard area under the 
curve approach, whereby quantity of time is 
adjusted for full or suffcient capability, in the 
case of YFC or YSC, respectively. ASCOT 
responses were translated into QALYs using 
recently published methodology that informs an 
exchange rate between ASCOT and EQ-5D-
3L (QALYs). 
For cost calculations, unit costs for individual 
resource items were combined with mean 
resource use and mean differences in cost per 
service-user were then compared. To assess 
whether these differences were statistically 
signifcant between intervention and control 
groups, we used 95% confdence intervals, 
estimated by 1,000 bootstrap replications. 
An incremental cost-effectiveness analysis was 
conducted to compare relevant costs and 
outcomes for providers and service-users in 
sub-markets using high levels of Care Act 
compatible interventions (open market and 
partnership) with those observed in LAs using 
non-Care Act compatible interventions. For 
outcomes collected using the ICECAP-A, 
we assessed the cost-effectiveness of the 
intervention in terms of its incremental cost 
per year of full capability (YFC) and year of 
suffcient capability (YSC), ie, the additional 
cost of producing one unit of additional beneft 
in terms of capability well-being. We also 
presented cost-effectiveness in terms of 
incremental cost per year of full SCRQoL. 
Additional costs and outcomes (well-being 
capabilities and SCRQoL) were calculated as 
the difference in costs and outcomes between 
LAs using Care Act compatible types of market 
shaping and those using non-Care Act 
compatible approaches. These differences 
were expressed in an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER). For each of the three 
QoL measures, we calculated and presented 
ICERs based upon only service users’ QoL 
responses and ICERs calculated incorporating 
both service-user and carer QoL. Cost-
effectiveness fgures based upon both 
service-user and carer QoL combined were 
used for the main base case results, as market 
shaping is likely to impact upon carer QoL. 
Results of economic evaluation 
Sample 
Seventy-fve service-users were recruited at 
baseline. Forty-nine service-users completed 
follow-up surveys at six months, giving a 
response rate of 65%. For the main base case 
analysis we included only those respondents 
who had provided both baseline and six-month 
follow-up data. This was to isolate the effect of 
market shaping on resource use and QoL over 
time and avoid making any misleading 
conclusions that could be due to losses to 
follow-up. Ninety-two carers were recruited at 
baseline and 54 carers completed follow-up 
questionnaires at six months, giving a response 
rate of 59%. 
Resource use 
Three aggregate cost variables were compiled 
using the various resource use variables to 
refect the different cost categories. Mean total 
costs per service-user for each of these three 
dimensions are presented in table A1. Overall 
mean total costs were higher for the 
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intervention group compared to the control 
group (£425 more). At baseline, mean cost per 
service-user for informal care was £664 higher 
in the intervention group compared to the 
control group; this was the only statistically 
signifcant difference. At follow-up, this 
difference in cost reduced signifcantly to just 
£199 more in the intervention group and was 
no longer statistically signifcantly different 
between groups. 
Outcomes 
Quality of life (QoL) scores did not differ much 
between service-users within the two groups. 
At baseline, QoL scores were slightly higher in 
the control group compared to the intervention 
group (table A2). However, at follow-up, QoL 
scores were slightly higher in the intervention 
group. These differences were not, however, 
statistically signifcant. Furthermore, QoL 
scores were higher at follow-up than they were 
at baseline across all four measures for the 
intervention group, however, for the control 
group, QoL scores were lower than they were 
at baseline across all measures. For carers, 
mean QoL scores were typically lower at 
follow-up than they were at baseline for both 
groups. This was with the exception of mean 
ICECAP-A score in the intervention group, 
which was slightly higher at follow-up than at 
baseline (0.640 vs. 0.626). When baseline and 
follow-up scores were combined for presenting 
benefts of market shaping in terms YFC, YSC 
and QALYs, table A3), differences in mean 
QoL scores were again very small and not 
statistically signifcantly different. 
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Table A1: Total costs (£s sterling) 
Non-compatible Care Act-compatible
(n=22)  (n=27) 







Healthcare resources 279 
(423) (-274 to 148) 
670 -371 
Social services 299 
(884) (-792.90 to 53) 
120 663 
Informal care 784 
(292) (124 to 1598)* 
1112 249 
Total costs 1361 
(952) (-526 to 1218) 
Follow-up costs 
197.93 351 
Healthcare resources 548.93 
(230) (107 to 621)* 
750.32 -375 
Social services 375.63 
(910) (-824.10 to 118) 
385.98 199 
Informal care 585.14 
(1146) (-504 to 863) 
1334.23 175 
Total cost 1509.70 
(1518) (-781 to 1098) 
2447 2872 425 
Aggregate cost 
(2100) (3649) (-1084 to 2175) 
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Bootstrap mean Bootstrap mean 
Measure difference differenceNon-compatible CA compatible Non-compatible CA compatible 
 (95% CI)  (95% CI)  (n=22) (n=27)  (n=19) (n=35) 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
Baseline index scores 
ASCOT SCT4 0.855 0.834 -0.02 0.597 0.627 0.025 
(SCRQoL) (0.140) (0.1574) (-0.11 to 0.07) (0.293) (0.214) (-0.122 to 0.203) 
ICECAP-A 0.762 0.761 -0.001 0.648 0.626 -0.031 
(full capability) (0.204) (0.207) (-0.12 to 0.12) (0.256) (0.237) (-0.265 to 0.120) 
ICECAP-A 
0.826 0.827 0.001 0.734 0.701 -0.033 
(suffcient 
(0.192) (0.203) (-0.129 to 0.117) (0.275) (0.244) (-0.168 to 0.135) 
capability) 
0.787 0.767 -0.02 0.535 0.564 0.025 
EQ-5D-5L 
(0.137) (0.150) (-0.11 to 0.07) (0.286) (0.210) (-0.116 to 0.175) 
Follow-up index scores 
ASCOT SCT4 0.835 0.844 0.01 0.589 0.605 0.005 
(SCRQoL) (0.138) (0.148) (-0.08 to 0.09) (0.290) (0.245) (-0.144 to 0.168) 
ICECAP-A 0.651 0.80 0.15 0.629 0.640 0.005 
(full capability) (0.263) (0.183) (0.01 to 0.28)* (0.255) (0.243) (-0.144 to 0.194) 
ICECAP-A 
0.723 0.867 0.14 0.717 0.722 0.005 
(suffcient 
(0.203) (0.174) (0.02 to 0.27) (0.281) (0.262) (-0.146 to 0.165) 
capability) 
0.767 0.777 0.01 0.527 0.543 0.005 
EQ-5D-5L 
(0.135) (0.145) (-0.06 to 0.09) (0.284) (0.240) (-0.149 to 0.176) 
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Table A3: Mean QoL outcomes 
Service-users Carers 
Bootstrap mean Bootstrap mean 
Measure difference differenceNon-compatible CA compatible Non-compatible CA compatible 
 (95% CI)  (95% CI)  (n=22) (n=27)  (n=19) (n=35) 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
0.369 0.391 0.02 0.314 0.323 0.008 
YFC 
(0.086) (0.095) (-0.04 to 0.07) (0.129) (0.107) (-0.068 to 0.089) 
0.405 0.424 0.02 0.356 0.369 0.013 
YSC 
(0.082) (0.092) (-0.03 to 0.07) (0.139) (0.114) (-0.062 to 0.099) 
0.387 0.386 -0.001 0.269 0.279 0.01 
QALYs 
(0.056) (0.069) (0.04 to 0.03) (0.134) (0.088) (-0.065 to 0.086) 
The following fgures show, for reference, the 
distribution of resource use across control and 
intervention sites. There is clear right skew in 
healthcare and informal care resource use in 
both case and control service-users. In the 
following graphs, control group refers to people 
in sub-markets which we classed as non-Care 
Act compliant (procurement and managed 
market), and intervention refers to people in 
sub-markets which we classed as Care Act 
compliant (open market and partnership). 
Figure A1: Distribution of healthcare costs incurred over the last three months in the ‘intervention’ sample at baseline 
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